UC Irvine

My dissertation investigates the relation between Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAN) and the Critique of Pure Reason. While it is clear that Kant somehow draws on the first Critique in MAN, the nature of the connection is mysterious. I solve the puzzle by arguing that Kant’s central philosophical objective in MAN is Leibniz-Wolffian: to express apodictically certain knowledge (in regards to empirical physics) in a systematic philosophy; rather than to extend the distinct kind of “a priori” knowledge that the first Critique proposes. Even though Kant’s core philosophical objective is Leibniz-Wolffian, his methods are not. The dissertation explores three crucial dimensions of this theme. First, I distinguish Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge in MAN from that in the first Critique. Second, I clarify the role of the “construction” of the concept matter in MAN through a comparison with his views on construction in geometry. Third, I examine Kant’s view on true judgment in MAN, i.e., the analytic/synthetic distinction.

My first step towards establishing the main thesis consists in showing that Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge in MAN differs from that in the first Critique (Chapter 1). To see this, I begin by articulating Kant’s hierarchy of logical perfection, which is his proposal for how different cognitive faculties unify previously indistinct representations. This hierarchy serves as Kant’s overall epistemic order on which the first Critique (i.e., the Analytic) precedes empirical concept formation (e.g., the empirical concept matter), which, in turn, precedes Kant’s “pure” natural science in MAN. The latter approach reflects Kant’s distinct conception of a “particular” logic, a “logic” of empirical physics. I argue that while a priori knowledge in the first Critique functions to unify indistinct perceptions, “a priori” knowledge as developed in MAN isolates the necessary elements of the empirical concept matter, in particular the trajectories of objects in pure intuition, and (Kantian) absolute space as a first ground.

The second chapter clarifies Kant’s suggestion that he imitates the “mathematical method” and proceeds according to a “construction” of the concept matter in pure intuition in MAN. I develop Kant’s position through comparison with his conception of Euclidean geometry, in particular his view on mathematical definitions and proofs. My thesis is that Kant’s geometrical construction serves as his model for isolating constructable component concepts through which the concept matter can be securely cognized. Kant modifies Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy by proposing that a proper “reflection” on empirical science draws not only on the pure representations from the understanding but also on those from the sensibility. Kantian construction in MAN can hence be thought of as a distinct form of “analysis” of an empirical concept, one that leads to “spatially” encoded (and thereby apodictically certain) determinations of the concept matter.

The third chapter investigates Kant’s view of true judgment in MAN. The analytic/synthetic distinction Kant proposed in the first Critique manifests his departure from Leibniz-Wolff’s approach that all truths can be derived through an application of the principle of contradiction by showing that the predicate is “contained” in the subject concept. I argue that the three criteria Kant gives for the distinction in the first Critique (containment, identity, and differing epistemic uses) express a unified view when understood in regards to the judgments Kant defends in MAN. A key move is to interpret his fundamental Explications of the concept matter as paradigmatic instances of his critical conception of analytic judgment. On this view, the containment criterion reflects containment in the constructed concept, not the “mere” concept.

Overall, my approach to MAN differs from the literature in the following respects. Kant’s essential philosophical moves can, I suggest, be interpreted in a way that MAN comes out as a consistent and interesting project, at least by Kant’s own standards, not as a partial or even a complete failure. In essence, Kant’s programmatic suggestions to derive a priori knowledge and to construct the concept matter in pure intuition have a consistent interpretation. The reading entails that the relation between the first Critique and MAN is rather loose. In the literature, one typically finds the view that Kant’s core philosophical objectives and conceptions in those two works align closely. My interpretation of MAN centers on a fine-grained comparison with Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, in particular the joint goal of logically perfected cognitions. Despite the clear evidence for such a connection—Kant’s appeal to “metaphysical foundations” and the mathematical method—this angle is underappreciated in the literature.