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Reading Descartes as a Stoic. Appropriate Action, Virtue, and the Passions
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https://doi.org/10.4000/philosant.777Abstract
Although Descartes does not use the terms officium or devoir with any frequency, his ethics gives a central place to the notion of appropriate action in a sense reminiscent of the Stoics's kathekon. Within this category are included a human being's duties to God and to other human heings, and actions whose aptness stems from their promotion of the survival and health of the body. While noting thèse parallels, I also show how Descartes's accounts of virtue and the passions diverge from Stoic views, ascribing these differences in part to his acceptance of the threefold division of goods (moral, bodily, external) rejected by the Stoics.
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