UC Irvine

Abstract: It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and inter-relationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.