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Social Information and Political Action in Honduras and Ghana
- Hughes, Douglas Alexander
- Advisor(s): Fowler, James H
Abstract
Existing research argues for one of two sides of a dichotomy. Either, individuals' social connections shape behavior because information flows along social connections; or, social connections shape behavior because of influence between social actors. A theory of social information reconclies these two positions, arguing instead that social information is context-dependent. When the task social information is oriented toward is relatively low cost, then social information's primary role is to spread information; however, when the task-orientation requires relatively higher cost, then social information shifts into an influential role.
To test these propositions, I employ two field experiments where tasks require distinct amounts of effort on the part of the political actors. In one, actors need forefit several hours' time to take political action on a weekend. In another, actors need pay no marginal cost, but instead only need coordinate their efforts in a common direction. A theory of social information predicts that in both tasks, individuals with a large number of social connections should be more effective than individuals with a small number of social connections; but for different reasons. In the high cost case, well-connected individuals can influence their relatively proximate social alters; in the low cost case, well-connected individuals are able to coordinate the actors of others by sending a commonly observed signal.
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