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A Rational Model of Vigilance in Motivated Communication

Abstract

We are able to learn from others through a combination of trust and vigilance: we trust and believe people who are reliable and have our interests at heart; we ignore those who are incompetent or self-interested. While past work has studied how others' competence influences social learning, relatively little attention has been paid to how others' motivations influence such processes. To address this gap, we develop a Bayesian model of vigilance that considers the speaker's instrumental self-interest, and test predictions of this model through an experiment. In accordance with our model, participants become more vigilant when informants stand to benefit from influencing their actions. When perceived self-interest is maximal, testimony can be discounted wholesale, rendering middle ground increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to find. Our results have implications for research on polarization, misinformation, and disagreement.

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