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The Minarchist’s Dilemma: How Status Preferences Undermine Libertarian Political Stability
- Fulton, Nathan Bartholomew
- Advisor(s): James, Aaron
Abstract
A minarchist conception of government prohibits levying taxes to fund redistributive insti- tutions and programs. This dissertation argues that due to ubiquitous preferences people hold for higher social status, no minarchist view is compatible with strong and uncompro- mising libertarian rights under an enduring social contract. Libertarians can embrace the redistributive state, or defend anarchy, but cannot justify the stable “minimal state.”
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