Skip to main content
eScholarship
Open Access Publications from the University of California

UC Irvine

UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations bannerUC Irvine

The Minarchist’s Dilemma: How Status Preferences Undermine Libertarian Political Stability

  • Author(s): Fulton, Nathan Bartholomew;
  • Advisor(s): James, Aaron;
  • et al.
Creative Commons 'BY-SA' version 4.0 license
Abstract

A minarchist conception of government prohibits levying taxes to fund redistributive insti- tutions and programs. This dissertation argues that due to ubiquitous preferences people hold for higher social status, no minarchist view is compatible with strong and uncompro- mising libertarian rights under an enduring social contract. Libertarians can embrace the redistributive state, or defend anarchy, but cannot justify the stable “minimal state.”

Main Content
For improved accessibility of PDF content, download the file to your device.
Current View