UCLA

This paper develops a model of voter turnout that embeds Riker and Ordeshooks (1968 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 62, 25-42 (doi:10.2307/1953324)) calculus of voting into the context of a social network. In the model, an individuals expressive benefits to voting depend on the behaviour of their social contacts. We show that there may be multiple equilibria and analyse how these equilibria depend on the structure of the network. We discuss six empirical implications of the model for turnout, some of which suggest novel answers to longstanding puzzles in the turnout literature, such as: why are higher income individuals more likely to vote even in cases when registration costs are low? Why is turnout so difficult to predict? Why does lowering registration costs disproportionately increase turnout among high-income voters? And why do we observe inertia in turnout across elections?