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A Test of Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving
Abstract
Previous economic experiments on dual-process reasoning in altruistic decisions have yielded inconclusive results. However, these studies do not create a conflict between affective and cognitive motives, resulting in imperfect identification. We interact standard cognitive and affective manipulations in a giving task, and hypothesize that the affective manipulation has stronger effects when we simultaneously put the cognitive system under load. In line with earlier results, we find little evidence for dual-process reasoning in giving. Our independent treatment checks cast doubt on the effectiveness of standard treatment manipulations and show that both cognitive and affective manipulations consistently have opposite effects on the two sexes. We discuss the implications of our findings for economic experiments in this nascent research field.
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