UC Santa Barbara

Social groups shape societal dynamics and individual identities, so it is important to have a clear understanding of the metaphysics of these groups. This dissertation offers insights into the metaphysics of social groups and corporate moral responsibility. In the first chapter, I propose and employ criteria to evaluate contemporary metaphysical views of groups, such as the set view, the robust set view, the stage view, the structuralist view, and the constitution view. In the second chapter, I propose a new typology to distinguish organized groups from other types of groups. In the third chapter, I present a novel perspective, arguing that organized groups are abstract artifacts. This idea comes from examples where groups persist without members, leading to the conclusion that these groups are not constantly dependent on their material instantiations. The final chapter shifts focus to metaphysic views of corporate and how to understand corporate moral responsibility. Considering corporations through different metaphysical lenses can give us a clearer understanding of potential instances where a corporation could be morally responsible independent of its individual members. This dissertation offers significant insights into the metaphysical nature of social groups and their moral responsibility.