UC Santa Barbara

This dissertation explores and defends non-eliminative mereological nihilism (‘NEN’). NEN is not a single view: many views can be non-eliminative and nihilist. An eliminative view is one that denies the existence of many kinds of ordinary objects: things like planets, cats, and chairs. A non-eliminative view is one that accepts the existence of all ordinary objects. Mereological nihilism is the view that composition never occurs, that composites (objects with proper parts) do not exist. NEN views are, therefore, those that accept all ordinary objects exist but deny any composites exist. NEN is an often overlooked—and so, underexplored—kind of view. Hence my intention to explore and defend it in this dissertation, which consists of consists of four, self-standing chapters. In chapter 1, I argue a particular NEN view does not conflict with Mooreanism. Mooreanism, very roughly, is a methodological approach espousing the intuitive and commonsensical in the face of philosophical arguments to the contrary. The main claim of the chapter is that, in accepting ordinary objects exist and (in some sense) have parts, NEN can avoid conflict with Mooreanism. NEN avoiding this conflict would be a significant theoretical virtue in the eyes of many Mooreans. Likewise, it gives (Moorean-inclined) nihilists reason to prefer NEN over eliminative forms of nihilism—assuming eliminativism conflicts with Mooreanism, which, prima facie, seems highly plausible. In chapter 2, I defend two NEN views against a “reference trivialisation” objection. Briefly, the objection is that the things to which those NEN views claim our ordinary object terms refer—their ‘reference-candidates’ for ordinary object terms—are objectionably dissimilar to what we take them to refer to. Put another way, the NEN reference-candidates fail to sufficiently satisfy the ‘psychological associated descriptions’ (PADs) for our ordinary object terms. And so, those NEN views “trivialise reference”. In response, I argue the NEN views do not trivialise reference; reason being, their reference-candidates can sufficiently satisfy the relevant PADs for our ordinary object terms. In chapter 3, I discuss a kind of question of significance for some NEN views. Said views appeal to the notion of simples arranged F-wise—simples being partless objects, ‘F’ standing for ordinary object sortals, e.g., cat, dog, tree. The questions of significance are Special Arrangement Questions (SAQs), which ask: under what conditions are simples arranged F-wise? It has been argued nihilists cannot provide decent SAQ answers. While I agree previous answers have not been decent, I think the issue lies with SAQs, not nihilism. First, I offer examples of previous SAQ answers. I argue they are incomplete (omit details) and circuitous (point to details in a roundabout way), then offer an explanation as to why; I conclude that SAQs are typically too demanding: specifying the relevant conditions is (typically) practically impossible. I conclude by arguing that, nevertheless, NEN offers us reason for thinking that, although we cannot typically answer SAQs, we can offer decent responses to them. Ultimately, then, the goal of this chapter is to offer some possible responses NENists can give when confronted with SAQs. Finally, in chapter 4, I appeal to NEN to dispute a commonly held claim in Buddhist metaphysics: that ordinary objects exist conventionally, but not ultimately. The chapter has three aims: (A1) to show Buddhist nihilism does not entail ordinary objects do not ultimately exist; (A2) to show Buddhists should accept the ‘NEN Proposal’: all ordinary objects do ultimately exist; and, lastly, (A3) to show Buddhists will have difficulty rejecting the NEN Proposal. First, in support of A1, I demonstrate the role nihilism is alleged to play, and actually plays, in classifying ordinary objects as conventional, but not ultimate, existents. I then argue for the NEN Proposal; in short, the argument is that if ordinary objects are as NENists claim, Buddhist ontology already countenances them as ultimate existents. I then respond to several objections against that argument. Lastly, I argue the NEN Proposal is consistent with the soteriological purposes of Buddhism (Buddhist goals for our salvation).