Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Some moral philosophers have suggested that a basicprohibition against intentional harm ought to be at the core ofmoral belief systems across human societies. Yet,experimental work suggests that not all harm is viewedequally—people often respond more negatively to harm thatoccurs among fellow social group members, rather thanbetween members of different groups. The present two studiesinvestigated how concerns about social group membershipfactor into the moral judgment system. Adults (N = 111, Study1) and children (N = 110, Study 2) evaluated instances ofinter- and intra-group harm under varying levels of cognitiveload. Both children and adults responded more slowly tointergroup harm than to intragroup harm. Furthermore, adultsunder cognitive load rated intergroup harm more lenientlythan intragroup harm, but adults who were not under loadrated the two types of behaviors similarly. These findingssuggest that across development, evaluations of intergroupharm rely more heavily on conscious deliberation thanevaluations of intragroup harm. Thus, people's evaluations ofharmful behaviors are made in light of information about thesocial category membership of the people involved.