Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Are the differences between human and alloanimal cognition a matter of kind or of degree? This question continues to generate controversial arguments for the uniqueness of certain features of human cognition, with no clear consensus in sight (see, e.g., Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002; Suddendorf & Corbalis, 2007). To move the debate into fresh territory, this symposium develops a proposal from conceptual blending theory (CBT: Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 2014) to argue that the differences in question are both a matter of kind and of degree. The symposium also takes up a line of inquiry initiated by Pelkey, who has proposed synthesizing CBT with related insights from Charles S. Peirce, Jakob Johann von Uexküll, and biosemiotics to build a stronger case for alloanimal blending. We bring together a diverse group of researchers to discuss human-unique cognitive abilities through the lens of CBT. Turner introduces CBT and outlines the cross- species cline of conceptual blending. Pelkey provides evidence for various types of blends in bats and discusses the conclusions of these analyses. Leonardis, Semenuks, and Coulson emphasize the importance of taking non-human perspectives in analyzing behaviors with CBT. Adachi discusses work on metaphorical and cross-modal mapping in primates. Forster serves as the moderator.