Narrative Philosophy of History. An Epistemic Approach
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Narrative Philosophy of History. An Epistemic Approach

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to vindicate the place that narrative has in historiography and recognize the rational components that are involved in narrative construction. The first chapter of this dissertation develops a novel account of some of the cognitive principles that are involved in narrative construction. One of the central aims of this chapter is to challenge the long-standing idea that narratives do not entail any rational or logical structure. I argue that the principles of organization brought to light by the Gestalt school of experimental psychology illuminate the principles underlying an organizational logic that historians engage in when constructing a narrative. Having developed an account of the “principles of narrative reason” in Chapter 1, I turn in Chapter 2 to the challenge presented by the multiplicity of interpretations in history. An answer to this challenge needs to explain the persistence of the diversity in historiography while maintaining epistemic standards. Chapter 2 first examines two attempted answers to this phenomenon. I argue that neither offers a satisfactory resolution. By developing a Wittgenstenien notion of aspect perception I provide a novel account of aspects as applied to the case of historical explanation, one that yields a more philosophically satisfactory answer to the “diversity problem.” Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation sketches a normative epistemic account of historiography. For although there exist multiple ways of understanding a particular event, we can nonetheless identify criteria that can guide us in deciding which narrative is better than another. I argue that three prevailing normative accounts of historiography (realist, antirealist and the tripartite theory of justification account) all prove unsuccessful in providing a good normative framework. My positive account is inspired by the works of Catherine Elgin and Alva Noë. Particularly, by Elgin’s notion of understanding–in opposition to knowledge– and Noë’s conception of reorganization in artistic creation. I conclude this dissertation by suggesting an important link between aesthetics and historiography. One that recognizes the value of reorganization and understanding as central to the epistemic significance of these disciplines.

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