UCLA

Statesmen are quick to declare that they will not negotiate with terrorists. Yet, the empirical record demonstrates that, despite statements to the contrary, many states do eventually negotiate with their terrorist challengers. My dissertation examines the circumstances under which states employ strategic negotiations with terrorist groups to resolve violent conflict. I argue that only when faced with a credible and capable adversary and afforded relative freedom of action domestically will states negotiate with terrorists. To test this theory, I use a multi-method approach that incorporates a cross-national study of all known strategic negotiations from 1968-2006 and three within-case studies (Israel, Northern Ireland, and the Philippines). Initial results suggest that negotiations are employed in about 13% of terrorist campaigns, certain types of groups are privileged, and negotiations only occur when statesmen can overcome domestic obstacles, namely public and veto player opposition. This study seeks to make definitive contributions to both science and society: Its findings will advance the literatures on conflict processes and policymaking, while informing the policy debate on effective counterterrorism strategies, an especially timely contribution given ongoing efforts to negotiate with terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Israel.