UC Irvine

This dissertation answers three questions in social choice, criminal justice, and education. Chapter 1 considers the possibility that changing the voting system used in a simple electoral environment might have a significant impact on the choice to participate when participation is costly. I find that the participation does significantly increase in an evaluative electoral system compared to a plurality voting system. Chapter 2 investigates the trade-off between centralization and productive complementarities in the creation of a dark network which is susceptible to disruption by outside elements. We find that networks become more decentralized as more of the network is visible to disruptors and they become more centralized as the productive incentives from centralization become stronger. Chapter 3 theorizes about the influence that different grading systems have on the effort choices of the students impacted by the grading system relative to their abilities. I find that eliciting high effort from all students is much easier in a more homogenous student population, but in a more heterogenous environment the absolute grading system offers more opportunity for high effort outcomes.