Skip to main content
eScholarship
Open Access Publications from the University of California

Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling

  • Author(s): Huttegger, Simon M.
  • Skyrms, Brian
  • Smead, Rory
  • Zollman, Kevin J.
  • et al.
Abstract

Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.

Many UC-authored scholarly publications are freely available on this site because of the UC's open access policies. Let us know how this access is important for you.

Main Content
Current View