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Rational Polarization: Sharing Only One's Best Evidence Can Lead to Group Polarization

Creative Commons 'BY' version 4.0 license
Abstract

Contemporary formal models aim to capture group polarization as the result of deliberation between rational agents. Paradigmatic models do, however, rely on rather limited agents, casting doubt on the conclusion that group polarization can be rationally reconstructed. In this paper, we use a recently developed Bayesian agent-based model of deliberation to investigate this conclusion. This model avoids problems we identify in a group of influential Bayesian polarization models. Our case study shows that a simple mechanism produces realistic patterns of group polarization: limited exchange of evidence across a sparse social network. We reflect on what our results mean for our formal understanding of rational group polarization.

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