UC San Diego

There is something painful about being blamed. Blame, as philosophers have put it, has a sting. Sometimes, however, it can sting to not be blamed—in particular, it can feel patronizing to have someone judge us not blameworthy. This is particularly the case when this judgment is formed in a way that suggests that we are not rational enough to be morally responsible. Mentally disabled people are often patronized in this way, sometimes with devastating downstream consequences. But what is it to patronize someone, such that doing so bears these immediate and long-term effects? And what is it to blame someone, such that to withhold blame can be to commit this wrong?

This dissertation aims to answer these questions. On the view I develop and defend, Agent A patronizes Agent B when (1) A forms a judgment that underestimates the degree to which B possesses some valuable rational capacity; (2) This underestimation is due to A’s failure to adhere to the relevant standard of epistemic care in forming that judgment; and (3) A’s epistemic failure involves a failure to suitably attend to B as an agent. This view can explain what is patronizing, when it is patronizing, about withholding blame from someone. On many plausible views, judging someone blameworthy involves judging her to be capable of responding to reasons. Withholding blame is patronizing, then, when it results from underestimating an agent’s reasons-responsiveness without sufficiently attending to her.

I explore some theoretical and ethical consequences of this view of patronizing. On the theoretical side, I argue that a successful theory of blame must explain how blame is the sort of thing the withholding of which can be patronizing. I show that some existing theories, namely attributionist theories, violate this constraint. On the ethical side, I explore how our obligation to avoid patronizing interacts with our widely recognized obligation to avoid wrongful blaming. I argue that some marginalized agents, such as autistic agents, are systemically patronized. I demonstrate that my view of patronizing can help us articulate this complex moral situation and can suggest a way forward.