Non-epistemic Values in Model Building, Theory Testing, and Communication in Science
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Non-epistemic Values in Model Building, Theory Testing, and Communication in Science

Abstract

Scientific practice has long portrayed itself as objective, in the sense that it is guided by epistemic values that are independent of ethical, social and political thought. The worry scientists have long had is that moral or political reasoning undermines science, as it contaminates the search for truth with social, political and ethical priorities and motives. However, there are many ways in which science is responsible to society, as the fruits of science are often used in value- laden settings. For instance, consider how science bears on the distribution of resources (Greenberg 2001, Kitcher 2001), or the evaluation of risks (Beck 1992, Douglas 2009, Hempel 1965), or how it shapes the material conditions of our lives (Winner 1986, Scolve 1995, Kitcher 2001). When one considers this more seriously, a clear separation between science and social concerns starts to seem less plausible. For this reason, feminist philosophers of science have criticized the value-free ideal, pointing out that non-epistemic values (i.e., social, political, ethical values) are not only unavoidable, but also often critical to proper scientific reasoning. Grappling with the notion that non-epistemic values play an important role in scientific reasoning, philosophers have asked themselves: when and how do non-epistemic values serve a permissible role? The purpose of this chapter is to survey the various responses to this question in the philosophical literature. In this dissertation, I will first describe the value-free ideal and the challenges that have been lodged against it. The subsequent discussion will center on philosophers’ proposed criteria of distinguishing between non-epistemic values that play a permissible versus impermissible role in scientific reasoning. I will then highlight some philosophical perspectives on the types of ethical considerations important to scientific reasoning. Finally, the dissertation project will close with a discussion on how non-epistemic values are often embedded in mathematical modeling work and what implications should be drawn from this.

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