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Case studies of an insider framework

  • Author(s): Bishop, M
  • Engle, S
  • Peisert, S
  • Whalen, S
  • Gates, C
  • et al.
Abstract

Much of the literature on insider threat assumes, explicitly or implicitly, a binary, perimeter-based notion of an insider. However, it is generally accepted that this notion is unrealistic. The Attribute-Based Group Access Control (ABGAC) framework is a generalization of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) which allows us to define a non-binary notion of "insiderness". In this paper, we illustrate how to use AB-GAC to perform insider threat analysis of high-risk resources with three case studies. This precise yet flexible identification of high-risk resources and associated insiders allows organizations to understand where to target efforts towards defending against the insider problem. © 2009 IEEE.

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