UC Irvine

Essentialism has often been maligned as a theory that is at odds with ethics. A standard view is that embracing essentialism means viewing certain groups of marginalized and vulnerable humans as essentially possessing certain characteristics. Statements that are often used as examples of purported essentialist claims are “women are irrational” or “Blacks are intellectually inferior to whites.” These claims are thought to be foundational to justifying the subordination of various minority and marginalized groups. Thus, essentialism has been seen as the root of serious and grave forms of discrimination and prejudice throughout history. Working towards a more just society therefore means opposing essentialism and extracting it from our moral systems. My project argues against this standard view by claiming that ethics is, in fact, committed to essentialism. Instead of rejecting essentialism, I show that it is a part of our natural ethical thought and argue that it is a necessary commitment in our ethical theories. My aim in this project is therefore, two-fold. My first aim is to demonstrate how we presume essentialism in our ordinary ethical thought. My second aim is to argue that we cannot do without a commitment to essentialism in our ethical theories without incurring serious consequences. My project is composed of three chapters. The first and second chapters have a similar structure. I first lay groundwork for the rest of the chapter by discussing key concepts and theories. The next section is dedicated to demonstrating how our ordinary ethical thought bears latent metaphysical commitments. The last section is dedicated to arguing that the relevant metaphysical commitments in informal ethics cannot be rejected in our formal ethical theorizing. The last chapter is dedicated to addressing objections and questions regarding my argument in the previous chapters. In chapter one, I argue that ethics bears a commitment to capacities. In the first section, I present a theory of capacities, a two-part division of ethics, and a theory of ontological commitment. In the following section, I demonstrate how a commitment to ethics is latent in our informal ethical thought. I show how the commitment to capacities is presumed when we make standard moral judgments such as “murder is wrong” or “slavery is wrong.” In the last section, I argue that the commitment to capacities cannot be avoided in our ethical theories. I highlight how capacities play a significant role in various ethical theories used to justify standard moral judgments. I argue that these theories cannot discard the commitment to capacities without serious consequences for their appeal, integrity, or intelligibility. I end by examining whether an epistemological, or anti-realist, commitment to capacities would be sufficient and outline two serious problems for such a position. In chapter two, I argue that ethics is committed to essentialism. In the first section, I present a basic theory of essentialism, discuss anti-essentialism in its various forms, and argue against a theory of essence as constituted by capacities. I then demonstrate how the latent commitment to capacities in informal ethical thought, carries with it a commitment to essentialism. In the last section, I argue that ethics cannot reject essentialism without giving up the ability to extend moral standing to all human beings. In chapter three, I address remaining questions about my project. In the first section, I address a concern regarding the necessity of capacities in ethics given the significant role of essences. I argue for the necessity of both capacities and essences in ethics by demonstrating that they serve different ethical purposes. In the next section, I address the question of whether a particular kind of essentialism is more suitable for ethics. I argue for the virtues of Aristotelian essentialism over modal essentialism. In the final section, I address the concern from social theorists regarding whether essentialism is morally pernicious in that it leads to discrimination and other immoral outcomes. I examine different two core versions of this concern, and argue that essentialism is not morally pernicious.