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An Experiment on Nash Implementation

  • Author(s): Charness, Gary B;
  • Cabrales, Antonio;
  • Corchon, Luis C
  • et al.
Abstract

We perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time, providing empirical evidence for the feasibility of such implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident, so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria. While our environment is stylized, our results offer hope that experiments can identify reasonable features for practical implementation mechanisms.

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