Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis
- Author(s): Bonanno, G;
- Tsakas, E
- et al.
Published Web Locationhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003
We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.