Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Many propositions are not known to be true or false, andmany phenomena are not understood. What determineswhat propositions and phenomena are perceived asknowable or unknowable? We tested whether factorsrelated to scientific methodology (a proposition’sreducibility and falsifiability), its intrinsic metaphysics (themateriality of the phenomena and its scope ofapplicability), and its relation to other knowledge (itscentrality to one’s other beliefs and values) influenceknowability. Across a wide range of naturalistic scientificand pseudoscientific phenomena (Studies 1 and 2), as wellas artificial stimuli (Study 3), we found that reducibilityand falsifiability have strong direct effects on knowability,that materiality and scope have strong indirect effects (viareducibility and falsifiability), and that belief and valuecentrality have inconsistent and weak effects onknowability. We conclude that people evaluate theknowability of propositions consistently with principlesproposed by epistemologists and practicing scientists.