UCLA

In the dissertation I explore the role of inconsistency in human reasoning as a way into broader questions about the structure of reasoning processes. In each of the next three chapters I defend the idea that certain types of inconsistency can be rational against a different pressure. These defenses fill out a picture of reasoning on which consistency plays an important role in managing specific modes of reasoning and in how we justify our beliefs. But inconsistency can arise in a well-functioning system, since it is in general better to draw on an inconsistent belief state than to force the system as a whole to be consistent or to only draw on a consistent subset of the total belief state in any given reasoning situation.

We can helpfully divide discomfort with inconsistent belief states into different types: worries about how an agent could come to be in an inconsistent belief states and worries about how an agent could (or should) function once they are in an inconsistent belief state. The latter worry is addressed in chapter 2, where I address strengths and weaknesses in the fragmentation view. The former worry can be further divided into concerns about how an agent could end up in an inconsistent belief state full stop and how they could do so rationally. I discuss how a rational agent could end up in an inconsistent belief set in chapter 3, defending myself from a possible objection from Niko Kolodny (using a view of rationality as correct response to different pressures) along the way. I argue for the existence of inconsistent beliefs full stop in chapter 4; inconsistent beliefs are possible on an interpretationist framework despite some Davidsonian worries to the contrary. In chapter 5 I pause to explore what these results mean for our understanding of human reasoning, including: the value of consistency, integrating different methods of reasoning, social reconstructions of reasoning, and how we should be evaluating agents.