UCLA

Grand strategy is the idea that there is an intellectually coherent "concept" available and desirable which integrates disparate foreign policy behaviours and activities into a unified whole which is readily implementable. This dissertation will probe -- using examples from the diplomatic history of Israel under Prime Minister Menachem Begin -- why 'grand strategy' fails to explain episodes in the history of Israeli foreign policy; Israeli history during this period highlights how one of the world's most agile foreign policies manifest in Israel's was able to thrive without one. The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest that the history of Israeli foreign policy challenges many assumptions of the presently popular "grand strategy" studies. By "grand strategy" I refer to the idea that states can, should and do possess an intellectually coherent integration of disparate foreign policy goals as a unity. The history of Israeli foreign policy offers many conceptual lessons that challenge the assumptions of this thinking.

There is much to be said for the idea that countries "should" have a "grand strategy." Especially in a world like ours where the average layman (and statesman) does not ponder or comprehend the nuance of world affairs and the subtlety of international history, the intellectualism of grand strategy studies is a virtuous ideal. But the very "intellectualism" inherent in the idea of grand strategy is neither attainable nor possible nor helpful in many circumstances. This study suggests that the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy may be appreciated as the conceptual “obverse” of grand strategy studies.