UC Berkeley

This dissertation argues that the experience of occupying Congress Poland in WWI fundamentally transformed how German imperialists thought about ruling ethnically diverse space. Germany faced a strategic paradox in 1914. German imperialists believed that seizing control of part or all of Congress Poland was necessary to reinforce the German Empire’s long vulnerable frontier with Russia. Yet planners worried that annexing any new Polish territories would provoke sustained resistance from Polish nationalists, which could destabilize German control in the region or even endanger the German Empire. German imperialists proposed two very different models for managing the resident Polish population. Proponents of the first model rigidly equated national identity and political loyalty. They recommended securing lasting control over annexations in Congress Poland through aggressive policies of homogenization. Nationalist groups like the Pan-German League infamously proposed establishing German rule by systematically repressing Polish culture, colonizing the region with ethnic German settlers, or even expelling Polish residents further eastward.

However, German political culture in 1914 also supported a competing multinational vision of ethnic management and imperial organization. Multinational imperial projects in Poland were promoted by intellectuals and politicians across the German political spectrum, but garnered particularly strong support from left liberals, moderate conservatives, and Roman Catholics. Multinationalists rejected the conceit that the Polish nation was irreconcilably hostile to German interests and argued that Polish national identity could be compatible with loyalty to the German Empire. Indeed, they held that institutional protections for cultural diversity actually reinforced imperial solidarity. They believed that Germany and Poland had common strategic interests, and that Berlin could manipulate Polish national sentiment with relative ease. Multinationalists proposed a grand compromise with Polish nationalists, wherein Germany would grant Poland political autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the German Empire. They believed that Berlin would best achieve its strategic objectives by creating an autonomous Kingdom of Poland in permanent military and political union with the German Empire. Berlin would secure its eastern frontier by controlling Poland’s foreign policy and wartime military command, but otherwise refrain from interfering in Polish domestic affairs. From 1914 to 1916, the military and civilian leadership of the German Empire carefully weighed the benefits and risks of these competing imperial models, and determined that Germany’s strategic interests lay in the creation of an autonomous Polish state under German suzerainty. On 5 November 1916, the German Empire established the Kingdom of Poland in pursuit of this aim.

However, I argue that Germany’s experiences in occupying Congress Poland after 1916 ultimately discredited multinational imperialism. Following the declaration of the Polish state, a series of political crises in occupied Poland undermined multinationalists’ faith that Poles would loyally collaborate with the German Empire. Dramatic demonstrations organized by Polish nationalists suggested that Polish opposition to German imperial leadership was more robust than expected. Conversely, the Polish intellectual and political elites that multinationalists had expected to rely upon, seemed either unwilling or unable to persuade their countrymen to accept German leadership. Critics of multinational imperialism argued that these crises proved that creating a Kingdom of Poland would only equip treacherous Poles with a political and military apparatus to use against Germany. Similarly, German military and political elites began to doubt that an autonomous Polish state would bolster German security, and instead began to regard Poland as a potential strategic threat. Though Germany continued to build a Kingdom of Poland until the end of the war, Berlin quietly adjusted its policies to balance and contain the Polish state, and fortify the German Empire against a possible betrayal by Warsaw. The collapse of the occupation ultimately discredited multinational strategies of ethnic management for both policy-makers in Berlin and the wider German public. The experiences of occupying Congress Poland in WWI ultimately convinced German imperialists that Polish national identity was incompatible with loyalty to the German Empire, and that national heterogeneity threatened imperial stability. When Germans later pondered how to project influence and manage ethnically diverse space, the occupation was cited as proof that Poles and other non-German populations represented an intrinsic threat to imperial security.

This dissertation draws upon two main bodies of sources. First, it examines a broad array of publications to examine wartime debates over imperial policy among intellectuals, politicians, and members of the German public. Second, extensive use has been made of archival records detailing the development of the German government’s plans for Congress Poland during the war, especially within the Chancellery, Imperial Office of the Interior, Foreign Office, and administration of German occupied-Poland. The first four chapters closely examine multinationalist proposals for establishing German imperial influence over Congress Poland in WWI. They examine the inspirations, assumptions, and plans of German multinationalists and how these differed from alternative models of imperial management. Collectively, these chapters argue that multinational imperialism was deeply rooted in Germany’s own national political culture, and thus found support among a broad and influential segment of the German political public. Chapter 5 examines how the military and civilian leadership of the German Empire crafted policy for achieving German objectives in Congress Poland from 1914-1916. It finds that both commanders in the German army and civilian leaders in the Chancellery, Foreign Office, and Imperial Office of the interior were sympathetic to the arguments of multinational imperialism. By the spring of 1916, a broad consensus in favor of multinational imperialism prevailed among Germany’s military and civilian leadership. Chapter 6 argues that political frictions in occupied-Poland after 1916 severely eroded the confidence of German intellectuals, military commanders, and civilian officials in the potential reliability of a Polish state under German suzerainty. The study concludes by briefly examining how Germans interpreted multinational imperial policy after WWI, and what conclusions they drew from Berlin’s failed attempt to establish an autonomous Polish state in permanent military and political union with the German Empire.