UCLA

One should not have certain pairs of beliefs and emotions, other things equal; one ought not to remain emotional about something after learning that it isn't real, other things equal; one ought to fear only what is dangerous, other things equal. The dissertation explains these norms.

Chapter One explains the rational mistake characteristic of a person who, for example, both fears flying and believes flying safe. For a person S to make the rational mistake at issue is (1) for her to have a belief B and emotion M such that facts which can warrant her in having B and facts which can warrant her in having M cannot together constitute facts which can warrant her in having both B and M and (2) for it to be the case that she can be warranted in having B and M only by facts which would warrant her in having both B and M together.

Chapter Two explains why we may rationally become emotional about known fictions yet may not rationally stay emotional about misinformation upon learning the truth. Roughly: The difference in what is rationally required of persons in these circumstances is explained by differences in what their emotions are about: persons who are simply misinformed are emotional about some situation (simpliciter), whereas persons who are emotional about known fictions are emotional about a situation in the fiction. This difference in what these persons' emotions are about is explained, ultimately, by their differing beliefs.

Chapter Three explains why one ought to fear only what is dangerous, other things equal. Roughly: To be fear is to be the means taken by a capacity that has the function of avoiding a danger. Thus, fear has the function of being a means to the avoidance of a particular danger (i.e. the feared thing). Thus, a fear can only be fully successful qua fear if the feared thing is, in fact, a danger; only if a fear is directed at a danger can it achieve its essential purpose. Thus, other things equal, one ought to fear only what is dangerous.