UC Davis

This dissertation examines how career expertise shapes legislative organization, behavior, and policy outcomes in the California State Legislature from 1993 to 2020. It delves into three main questions: the primary factors influencing committee assignments, the impact of career-committee congruence on legislative entrepreneurship, and the relationship between career expertise, committee membership, and bill viability.

Chapter 1, utilizing logistic regression models, reveals that career expertise significantly predicts committee assignments, surpassing district and partisan considerations. Chapter 2, employing zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, illustrates that career-committee congruent legislators introduce nearly double the bills within their expertise, albeit with fewer initial coauthors. Chapter 3, using 2-stage Heckman selection models, finds that bills authored by career-committee congruent legislators are more likely to advance through the legislative pipeline and garner higher support in committee and chamber floor votes.

In conclusion, this research underscores the dynamic roles of career expertise and committee membership in driving legislative entrepreneurship and producing viable policy proposals, enhancing our understanding of agenda-setting behind closed doors.