Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Counterfactual reasoning is at the centre of human daily life and plays a key role in shaping our moral and social judgments. Its effect on moral judgment in adulthood, such as justifying immoral behavior (e.g., “If you had not left your phone on the table, it would not have been stolen.”), has been studied for years. However, we still know very little about when counterfactual reasoning starts to affect humans' moral judgments. To test this, we examined the effect of better and worse counterfactual alternatives on 5-6-year-olds' (N = 91) moral and happiness judgments. We found that children judged social exclusion (e.g., a new kid has to play alone while other children play together) as less morally acceptable after imagining how it could have been better (e.g., the new kid and other children at the school could have played all together), but, contrary to past work with adults, they did not justify it after imagining how it could have been even worse (e.g., the other children could have broken the new kid's toy). However, children's happiness judgments showed the opposite effect: they reported feeling happier about reality after imagining a worse counterfactual alternative compared to children who only thought about what actually happened. Keywords: counterfactuals; moral judgment; children; happiness judgment