UC San Diego

My research explores how technological competition among great powers transforms governments from advocates of economic openness into active makers of anti-globalization policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom that deepening economic interdependence will lead to widespread economic liberalization, I argue that governments' incentive to win an edge in technological competition with their rivals is reversing the trend of globalization. I examine this phenomenon with four theoretical and empirical innovations. First, I develop a government-centered theory that treats governments as autonomous actors with the goal of maximizing their countries' relative power compared to their rivals. This goal motivates governments to restrict investment and trade flows that can promote the technological advancement of their geopolitical rivals, pitting governments against internationally oriented tech firms. Second, in Chapter 1, I apply the analytical framework to investment screenings in the US. Utilizing a novel network-based measurement of technological interdependence between Chinese and American firms, I find that the US government is more likely to impose investment restrictions on American firms that own key technologies to prevent technological diffusion to China. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that competitive firms are in a better position to lobby for less restrictive measures. Third, in Chapter 2, I investigate how a national security justification can curb firms' opposition to restrictive measures in China's context. Based on a survey experiment with 1,127 firm managers, I find that compared to framing-neutral settings, restrictive measures with national security justifications on average receive 15% more support among the respondents. Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine inter-governmental bargaining over trade barriers. The high return-on-investment uncertainty over high-tech products and governments' inability to commit to long-term settlements prevent them from finding bilateral solutions for trade disputes. This dynamic results in a prevalent use of punitive tariffs in high-tech sectors.