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Open Access Publications from the University of California

Treaties Unchained: Restoring Checkers and Balances to Executive Agreement-Making in the U.N. Security Council


This Comment uses the controversial Iran Nuclear Deal that was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a case study. Specifically, it discusses the implications of unilateral Executive agreement-making in this international body for constitutional separation of powers and the legitimacy of the UNSC itself. In doing so, it analyzes the historical development ofthe UNSC, the Supreme Court decision in Medellin, and UNSC Resolutions. It finally presents three solutions that can promote checks and balances in this area, especially as it relates to executive power to enter into treaty-like agreements via the UNSC without Congressional approval.

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