UC Riverside

Kant’s philosophy, it is often thought, leads to an untenable picture of the self. He argues that we cannot have knowledge of the type of entity we are, but seems to contradict that conclusion by claiming we are free and morally responsible. Commentators accuse him of blindly prioritizing his ethical views, not recognizing that his metaphysical views prohibit the very picture of the self his moral theory necessitates. Sympathetic interpreters of Kant’s view of the self focus on either his theoretical or ethical view, despite Kant’s insistence that the two are interdependent.

I argue that Kant offers us a deeply consistent, unified, and plausible view of the self. For Kant, an individual necessarily thinks and acts as though he or she—and any other human being—is a substantial, complete entity with an identity that remains the same over time. As this work shows, the significance of the self, for Kant, is practical, not theoretical.

A theory aims to gain knowledge of the self and examine what type of object it is and how it is constituted. Perhaps we are spiritual, immaterial souls, or alternatively, entities ultimately reducible to the brain or body. I establish that Kant thinks that such views are doomed to be either tautological or contradictory. This is because they answer the wrong question.

The right question is not how the self is constituted, but what we are committed to. Kant thinks the answer is clear: we must hold ourselves and others responsible, and we must believe that we are free and that our actions and choices matter. My interpretation reveals that Kant’s true aim is to demonstrate how we can make good on these commitments without fear of being contradicted by theory. Theorizing about the self, according to Kant, is idle. But recognizing so makes room for one to act in accordance with one’s commitments, both moral and explanatory. Furthermore, I prove that Kant thinks we must act under the idea of the self not just to hold ourselves and others responsible but to view the world as the causally unified place we do.