UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: Breakdown by Item for May through August, 2026
| Item | Title | Total requests | Download | View-only | %Dnld |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 689 | 334 | 355 | 48.5% |
| 9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 588 | 248 | 340 | 42.2% |
| 0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 497 | 109 | 388 | 21.9% |
| 223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 457 | 157 | 300 | 34.4% |
| 5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 440 | 174 | 266 | 39.5% |
| 5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 391 | 126 | 265 | 32.2% |
| 0562w1nq | War and Taxes | 332 | 144 | 188 | 43.4% |
| 6sx2t3sn | The Corporate Census | 282 | 245 | 37 | 86.9% |
| 02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 262 | 101 | 161 | 38.5% |
| 9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 247 | 0 | 247 | 0.0% |
| 57v1j2pm | High Rates and Low Taxes | 204 | 183 | 21 | 89.7% |
| 0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 200 | 34 | 166 | 17.0% |
| 30v1j39r | Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law | 194 | 43 | 151 | 22.2% |
| 1wj7c2tb | The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries | 164 | 65 | 99 | 39.6% |
| 6w72428k | Insider Trading Against the Corporation | 163 | 119 | 44 | 73.0% |
| 0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 160 | 52 | 108 | 32.5% |
| 9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 159 | 28 | 131 | 17.6% |
| 6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 151 | 38 | 113 | 25.2% |
| 2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 150 | 19 | 131 | 12.7% |
| 16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 146 | 51 | 95 | 34.9% |
| 4tn3p38g | Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers | 144 | 60 | 84 | 41.7% |
| 2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 136 | 38 | 98 | 27.9% |
| 9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 133 | 45 | 88 | 33.8% |
| 0h29z5vx | Benchmark Manipulation | 132 | 44 | 88 | 33.3% |
| 5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 127 | 50 | 77 | 39.4% |
| 68p5v8g7 | Insider Trading by Other Means | 124 | 104 | 20 | 83.9% |
| 03x8f717 | Insider Trading and Position Limits | 123 | 94 | 29 | 76.4% |
| 8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 121 | 36 | 85 | 29.8% |
| 8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 121 | 54 | 67 | 44.6% |
| 5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 119 | 22 | 97 | 18.5% |
| 33c994dv | Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025 | 118 | 55 | 63 | 46.6% |
| 3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 117 | 54 | 63 | 46.2% |
| 78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 117 | 33 | 84 | 28.2% |
| 4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 113 | 57 | 56 | 50.4% |
| 2vn4m010 | Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases | 108 | 34 | 74 | 31.5% |
| 6w3620jj | The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States | 106 | 21 | 85 | 19.8% |
| 82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 106 | 33 | 73 | 31.1% |
| 2cd0b28j | Ambulance diversions following public hospital emergency department closures | 103 | 29 | 74 | 28.2% |
| 2hv088zv | Crypto Associations | 98 | 71 | 27 | 72.4% |
| 5r09149k | A Theory of the REIT | 92 | 30 | 62 | 32.6% |
| 9cv5t0bf | Generalist Courts and Controlling Shareholders | 87 | 53 | 34 | 60.9% |
| 00p8x35h | REVITALIZING SEC RULE 14a-8'S ORDINARY BUSINESS EXCLUSION: PREVENTING SHAREHOLDER MICROMANAGEMENT BY PROPOSAL | 81 | 0 | 81 | 0.0% |
| 553455cf | On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take? | 81 | 36 | 45 | 44.4% |
| 01r4913q | The Problem with Preferences | 78 | 0 | 78 | 0.0% |
| 0w33z22h | The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance | 78 | 36 | 42 | 46.2% |
| 4mk1v88g | Incorporating Responsibility | 78 | 27 | 51 | 34.6% |
| 9hg508zc | The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending | 78 | 10 | 68 | 12.8% |
| 1mx8t9rc | Globalization and the Middle Class | 75 | 37 | 38 | 49.3% |
| 22p2h0p0 | The Law and Economics of An Act to Encourage Privateering Associations | 75 | 56 | 19 | 74.7% |
| 98p7d0wz | The Free Radicals of Tort | 73 | 30 | 43 | 41.1% |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.