UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: Breakdown by Item for June through September, 2026
| Item | Title | Total requests | Download | View-only | %Dnld |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 679 | 337 | 342 | 49.6% |
| 9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 613 | 236 | 377 | 38.5% |
| 223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 562 | 187 | 375 | 33.3% |
| 6sx2t3sn | The Corporate Census | 494 | 441 | 53 | 89.3% |
| 5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 483 | 125 | 358 | 25.9% |
| 0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 439 | 145 | 294 | 33.0% |
| 5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 435 | 206 | 229 | 47.4% |
| 57v1j2pm | High Rates and Low Taxes | 318 | 286 | 32 | 89.9% |
| 0562w1nq | War and Taxes | 279 | 143 | 136 | 51.3% |
| 9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 245 | 0 | 245 | 0.0% |
| 6w72428k | Insider Trading Against the Corporation | 241 | 191 | 50 | 79.3% |
| 0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 221 | 29 | 192 | 13.1% |
| 30v1j39r | Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law | 207 | 70 | 137 | 33.8% |
| 0h29z5vx | Benchmark Manipulation | 204 | 47 | 157 | 23.0% |
| 02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 189 | 78 | 111 | 41.3% |
| 2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 186 | 18 | 168 | 9.7% |
| 68p5v8g7 | Insider Trading by Other Means | 179 | 152 | 27 | 84.9% |
| 2hv088zv | Crypto Associations | 168 | 135 | 33 | 80.4% |
| 8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 166 | 66 | 100 | 39.8% |
| 1wj7c2tb | The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries | 164 | 65 | 99 | 39.6% |
| 03x8f717 | Insider Trading and Position Limits | 158 | 124 | 34 | 78.5% |
| 78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 153 | 33 | 120 | 21.6% |
| 5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 137 | 32 | 105 | 23.4% |
| 9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 137 | 23 | 114 | 16.8% |
| 2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 134 | 33 | 101 | 24.6% |
| 9hg508zc | The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending | 129 | 39 | 90 | 30.2% |
| 8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 126 | 48 | 78 | 38.1% |
| 22p2h0p0 | The Law and Economics of An Act to Encourage Privateering Associations | 123 | 99 | 24 | 80.5% |
| 0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 114 | 35 | 79 | 30.7% |
| 4tn3p38g | Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers | 114 | 63 | 51 | 55.3% |
| 6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 112 | 22 | 90 | 19.6% |
| 6w3620jj | The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States | 110 | 17 | 93 | 15.5% |
| 3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 107 | 36 | 71 | 33.6% |
| 16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 106 | 18 | 88 | 17.0% |
| 5r09149k | A Theory of the REIT | 104 | 33 | 71 | 31.7% |
| 9cv5t0bf | Generalist Courts and Controlling Shareholders | 101 | 61 | 40 | 60.4% |
| 4mk1v88g | Incorporating Responsibility | 99 | 34 | 65 | 34.3% |
| 5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 98 | 16 | 82 | 16.3% |
| 2vn4m010 | Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases | 96 | 22 | 74 | 22.9% |
| 82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 92 | 28 | 64 | 30.4% |
| 43z6188m | Insider Giving | 90 | 15 | 75 | 16.7% |
| 9mf5b18q | Board-Centric Contractarianism | 89 | 44 | 45 | 49.4% |
| 9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 89 | 34 | 55 | 38.2% |
| 1px0j1ww | Assessing Dodd-Frank | 87 | 46 | 41 | 52.9% |
| 11z782fh | The Global Effects of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms | 84 | 55 | 29 | 65.5% |
| 4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 79 | 46 | 33 | 58.2% |
| 68w9330c | The Parable of the Talents | 77 | 39 | 38 | 50.6% |
| 907094tx | Violent White-Collar Crime | 76 | 38 | 38 | 50.0% |
| 2z02j06m | The Future of US International Corporate Tax Reform | 74 | 46 | 28 | 62.2% |
| 8rw0w6d8 | Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, and the Liability Structure of Investor Time Horizons | 74 | 9 | 65 | 12.2% |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.