UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: Breakdown by Item for April through July, 2026
| Item | Title | Total requests | Download | View-only | %Dnld |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 643 | 182 | 461 | 28.3% |
| 5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 528 | 269 | 259 | 50.9% |
| 0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 493 | 65 | 428 | 13.2% |
| 5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 457 | 145 | 312 | 31.7% |
| 0562w1nq | War and Taxes | 309 | 152 | 157 | 49.2% |
| 02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 262 | 105 | 157 | 40.1% |
| 5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 259 | 128 | 131 | 49.4% |
| 223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 208 | 80 | 128 | 38.5% |
| 30v1j39r | Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law | 200 | 43 | 157 | 21.5% |
| 9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 187 | 0 | 187 | 0.0% |
| 0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 180 | 60 | 120 | 33.3% |
| 2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 172 | 36 | 136 | 20.9% |
| 16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 169 | 78 | 91 | 46.2% |
| 9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 168 | 37 | 131 | 22.0% |
| 4tn3p38g | Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers | 161 | 65 | 96 | 40.4% |
| 9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 158 | 61 | 97 | 38.6% |
| 0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 154 | 31 | 123 | 20.1% |
| 1wj7c2tb | The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries | 140 | 43 | 97 | 30.7% |
| 33c994dv | Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025 | 138 | 57 | 81 | 41.3% |
| 2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 137 | 51 | 86 | 37.2% |
| 5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 136 | 57 | 79 | 41.9% |
| 2cd0b28j | Ambulance diversions following public hospital emergency department closures | 132 | 36 | 96 | 27.3% |
| 4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 132 | 63 | 69 | 47.7% |
| 82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 132 | 43 | 89 | 32.6% |
| 5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 131 | 29 | 102 | 22.1% |
| 6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 126 | 38 | 88 | 30.2% |
| 8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 124 | 56 | 68 | 45.2% |
| 78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 122 | 41 | 81 | 33.6% |
| 6w3620jj | The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States | 118 | 29 | 89 | 24.6% |
| 2vn4m010 | Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases | 116 | 40 | 76 | 34.5% |
| 3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 114 | 56 | 58 | 49.1% |
| 553455cf | On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take? | 114 | 47 | 67 | 41.2% |
| 6sx2t3sn | The Corporate Census | 106 | 82 | 24 | 77.4% |
| 00p8x35h | REVITALIZING SEC RULE 14a-8'S ORDINARY BUSINESS EXCLUSION: PREVENTING SHAREHOLDER MICROMANAGEMENT BY PROPOSAL | 105 | 0 | 105 | 0.0% |
| 98p7d0wz | The Free Radicals of Tort | 94 | 39 | 55 | 41.5% |
| 4339k3jv | Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur | 93 | 33 | 60 | 35.5% |
| 01r4913q | The Problem with Preferences | 91 | 0 | 91 | 0.0% |
| 0w33z22h | The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance | 89 | 33 | 56 | 37.1% |
| 03x8f717 | Insider Trading and Position Limits | 86 | 60 | 26 | 69.8% |
| 8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 86 | 33 | 53 | 38.4% |
| 57v1j2pm | High Rates and Low Taxes | 80 | 60 | 20 | 75.0% |
| 6z0992jz | On the Nature of Corporations | 77 | 22 | 55 | 28.6% |
| 1nw4d3hs | Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom | 75 | 0 | 75 | 0.0% |
| 1mx8t9rc | Globalization and the Middle Class | 72 | 35 | 37 | 48.6% |
| 7hj966tc | The Politics of Corporate Governance: Roe's Strong Managers, Weak Owners | 72 | 0 | 72 | 0.0% |
| 9cv5t0bf | Generalist Courts and Controlling Shareholders | 71 | 40 | 31 | 56.3% |
| 92p2j4fm | The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight | 69 | 0 | 69 | 0.0% |
| 6w72428k | Insider Trading Against the Corporation | 68 | 36 | 32 | 52.9% |
| 0rs1s039 | A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and <em>Conestoga Wood</em> | 67 | 0 | 67 | 0.0% |
| 68p5v8g7 | Insider Trading by Other Means | 63 | 46 | 17 | 73.0% |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.