UCLA Law & Economics Series

Parent: UCLA School of Law

eScholarship stats: History by Item for March through June, 2025

ItemTitleTotal requests2025-062025-052025-042025-03
5jv5q8tfDExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened20764437030
0jf6x07zShare Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law1685057547
0wp5r2grThe Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms15661402926
5tc4j0qnThe Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance13332393428
9rc92037A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions12744362621
9fj1m40zUnavoidable Accident11839303019
0w33z22hThe Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance1137321127
5p23j13bBoard Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI10541311716
2313h061Proximate Cause Decoded9734292311
5c1246c7Bondholders and Securities Class Actions95661496
01r4913qThe Problem with Preferences85334471
0zq5p2wxThe Negligence Dualism853729712
9mp482qrSecurities Regulation and Big Business833923147
553455cfOn the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take?82581383
02f4p0cmThe SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer793328108
1nw4d3hsCorporate Directors in the United Kingdom7724191519
223601qwChapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I7739141113
5qd2w3r0BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages714010912
3w7521mnRetiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer702822713
8g86k7nbWhen American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s6955626
16p3n0m2Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance?632915136
78z9w8b0Causation and Foreseeability591720148
33c994dvClimate Policy Reform Options in 2025582615611
4mm4s894Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II54281565
8hx9p46pOn the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board)512014512
9wf582c0Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law4120687
2js5w2wkToward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust4024637
82n3b1t1Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia4026752
98p7d0wzThe Free Radicals of Tort3522553
7657h82bA Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors3314946
9cv5v753Ethics for Examiners33121065
4b2876hhOpinions First - Argument Afterwards3214828
6z0992jzOn the Nature of Corporations3218644
92p2j4fmThe Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight299578
2h66k2ddNo Conflict2813924
6j85h1dcRelative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises2818334
1dk6n25sPreserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions2713473
6qx8862qComments on the HHS' Flawed Post-Hobby Lobby Rules2718711
1c58t4zfCreditors' Committees as Estate Representatives in Bankruptcy Litigation261475
0rs1s039A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and <em>Conestoga Wood</em>2516324
34w486jmTextualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions2410635
761892pcFee Shifting: Delaware's Self-Inflicted Wound2215322
8469g9s7Multiple Claims, <em>Ivanhoe</em> and Substantive Consolidation2241044
11h7g8hbCorporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State: A Comment on Strine &amp; Walker2014312
8q4061b8Must Salmon Love Meinhard? <em>Agape</em> and Partnership Fiduciary Duties1810431
39d3r8kbThe Best of All Possible Worlds? - A Rejoinder to Justice Liu175444
3gh1h2rnRevitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's Ordinary Business Exemption: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal1711213
6266q2sgThe Parable of the Talents131021
6kv8n72tRecalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy133343

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