UCLA Law & Economics Series
Parent: UCLA School of Law
eScholarship stats: History by Item for April through July, 2026
| Item | Title | Total requests | 2026-07 | 2026-06 | 2026-05 | 2026-04 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9rc92037 | A Course Correction for Controlling Shareholder Transactions | 643 | 66 | 223 | 164 | 190 |
| 5tc4j0qn | The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance | 528 | 269 | 83 | 84 | 92 |
| 0wp5r2gr | The Borat Problem In Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, And Standard Forms | 493 | 60 | 128 | 172 | 133 |
| 5jv5q8tf | DExit Drivers: Is Delaware’s Dominance Threatened | 457 | 45 | 160 | 130 | 122 |
| 0562w1nq | War and Taxes | 309 | 45 | 57 | 129 | 78 |
| 02f4p0cm | The SEC as an Entrepreneurial Enforcer | 262 | 39 | 44 | 103 | 76 |
| 5p23j13b | Board Control of a Charity’s Subsidiaries: The Saga of OpenAI | 259 | 83 | 35 | 80 | 61 |
| 223601qw | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part I | 208 | 57 | 29 | 76 | 46 |
| 30v1j39r | Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law | 200 | 17 | 65 | 57 | 61 |
| 9wf582c0 | Director versus Shareholder Primacy in New Zealand Company Law as Compared to U.S.A. Corporate Law | 187 | 43 | 78 | 31 | 35 |
| 0jf6x07z | Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law | 180 | 21 | 44 | 67 | 48 |
| 2313h061 | Proximate Cause Decoded | 172 | 15 | 33 | 38 | 86 |
| 16p3n0m2 | Do We Need a Restatement of the Law of Corporate Governance? | 169 | 21 | 22 | 70 | 56 |
| 9fj1m40z | Unavoidable Accident | 168 | 23 | 28 | 53 | 64 |
| 4tn3p38g | Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers | 161 | 19 | 29 | 69 | 44 |
| 9mp482qr | Securities Regulation and Big Business | 158 | 8 | 38 | 64 | 48 |
| 0zq5p2wx | The Negligence Dualism | 154 | 17 | 27 | 66 | 44 |
| 1wj7c2tb | The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries | 140 | 31 | 34 | 46 | 29 |
| 33c994dv | Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025 | 138 | 3 | 30 | 64 | 41 |
| 2js5w2wk | Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust | 137 | 17 | 33 | 39 | 48 |
| 5c1246c7 | Bondholders and Securities Class Actions | 136 | 16 | 32 | 44 | 44 |
| 2cd0b28j | Ambulance diversions following public hospital emergency department closures | 132 | 15 | 15 | 59 | 43 |
| 4mm4s894 | Chapter 11 at the School of Subchapter V: Part II | 132 | 5 | 33 | 57 | 37 |
| 82n3b1t1 | Managerial Judging Goes International But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the Reforms to Expedite the Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia | 132 | 29 | 15 | 37 | 51 |
| 5qd2w3r0 | BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages | 131 | 12 | 26 | 42 | 51 |
| 6j85h1dc | Relative Value Health Insurance: A Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Medical Care Cost Crises | 126 | 12 | 16 | 55 | 43 |
| 8hx9p46p | On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board) | 124 | 45 | 23 | 21 | 35 |
| 78z9w8b0 | Causation and Foreseeability | 122 | 10 | 28 | 39 | 45 |
| 6w3620jj | The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the United States | 118 | 9 | 25 | 41 | 43 |
| 2vn4m010 | Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases | 116 | 19 | 27 | 45 | 25 |
| 3w7521mn | Retiree Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending: A Study of Expert Views, Consumer | 114 | 10 | 26 | 48 | 30 |
| 553455cf | On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A Transplant Take? | 114 | 12 | 27 | 25 | 50 |
| 6sx2t3sn | The Corporate Census | 106 | 37 | 69 | ||
| 00p8x35h | REVITALIZING SEC RULE 14a-8'S ORDINARY BUSINESS EXCLUSION: PREVENTING SHAREHOLDER MICROMANAGEMENT BY PROPOSAL | 105 | 7 | 12 | 51 | 35 |
| 98p7d0wz | The Free Radicals of Tort | 94 | 20 | 16 | 23 | 35 |
| 4339k3jv | Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur | 93 | 5 | 15 | 41 | 32 |
| 01r4913q | The Problem with Preferences | 91 | 11 | 14 | 34 | 32 |
| 0w33z22h | The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance | 89 | 11 | 13 | 33 | 32 |
| 03x8f717 | Insider Trading and Position Limits | 86 | 33 | 53 | ||
| 8g86k7nb | When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s | 86 | 21 | 14 | 25 | 26 |
| 57v1j2pm | High Rates and Low Taxes | 80 | 48 | 32 | ||
| 6z0992jz | On the Nature of Corporations | 77 | 10 | 7 | 27 | 33 |
| 1nw4d3hs | Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom | 75 | 6 | 17 | 26 | 26 |
| 1mx8t9rc | Globalization and the Middle Class | 72 | 4 | 15 | 38 | 15 |
| 7hj966tc | The Politics of Corporate Governance: Roe's Strong Managers, Weak Owners | 72 | 7 | 30 | 22 | 13 |
| 9cv5t0bf | Generalist Courts and Controlling Shareholders | 71 | 21 | 50 | ||
| 92p2j4fm | The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight | 69 | 12 | 18 | 17 | 22 |
| 6w72428k | Insider Trading Against the Corporation | 68 | 35 | 33 | ||
| 0rs1s039 | A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in <em>Hobby Lobby</em> and <em>Conestoga Wood</em> | 67 | 9 | 12 | 26 | 20 |
| 68p5v8g7 | Insider Trading by Other Means | 63 | 24 | 39 |
Note: Due to the evolving nature of web traffic, the data presented here should be considered approximate and subject to revision. Learn more.