Ted Bergstrom Papers
Parent: Department of Economics
eScholarship stats: History by Item for December, 2024 through March, 2025
| Item | Title | Total requests | 2025-03 | 2025-02 | 2025-01 | 2024-12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 69f4b8vz | How often do economists self-archive? | 2,684 | 289 | 706 | 794 | 895 |
| 79n18571 | Maximal elements of Acyclic Relations on Compact Sets | 157 | 9 | 7 | 139 | 2 |
| 1wf0r099 | Free Labor for Costly Journals | 154 | 27 | 42 | 42 | 43 |
| 62c3d5c4 | Log-concave Probability and its Applications | 142 | 51 | 29 | 32 | 30 |
| 6kr536bv | On the Economics of Polygyny | 91 | 18 | 38 | 16 | 19 |
| 11j5d1t4 | Private Demands for Public Goods | 76 | 25 | 24 | 12 | 15 |
| 76x6790s | A Survey of Theories of the Family | 71 | 16 | 20 | 20 | 15 |
| 9mf6b337 | On the Private Provision of Public Goods | 57 | 35 | 11 | 5 | 6 |
| 0n9376rh | Economics in a Family Way | 56 | 11 | 16 | 20 | 9 |
| 41h94387 | The Eigenfactor Metrics: A network approach to assessing scholarly journals | 55 | 17 | 11 | 16 | 11 |
| 8cs5j7fk | When is a Man's Life Worth More Than His Human Capital? | 55 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 11 |
| 4jq389zf | Primogeniture, Monogamy, and Reproductive Success in a Stratified Society | 49 | 10 | 16 | 19 | 4 |
| 9nb6m34h | A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--And Other Household Mysteries | 49 | 7 | 25 | 5 | 12 |
| 55s5j6qz | Courtship As A Waiting Game | 40 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 4 |
| 60s2f9ps | Love and Spaghetti, The Opportunity Cost of Virtue | 39 | 9 | 16 | 7 | 7 |
| 7qm3n8d0 | Demographics and the Political Sustainability of Pay-as-you-go Social Security | 38 | 9 | 8 | 15 | 6 |
| 03f6s9jt | The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation | 37 | 12 | 17 | 3 | 5 |
| 6pm7s10d | To read and be read: When monopolists control access to academic prestige | 37 | 12 | 10 | 4 | 11 |
| 0q43f52p | Teaching Economics Interactively: A Cannibal's Dinner Party | 35 | 8 | 15 | 8 | 4 |
| 7893c1mz | Extracting Valuable Information from Classroom Trading Pits | 35 | 5 | 18 | 8 | 4 |
| 7p61c2xm | When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently? | 35 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 13 |
| 9w1371kd | The effects of cohort size on marriage markets in twentieth century Sweden | 35 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 5 |
| 7s4493rv | Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods: An improved proof | 34 | 11 | 11 | 6 | 6 |
| 96j9c12b | When are there Condorcet winners despite extremist preferences | 34 | 7 | 10 | 11 | 6 |
| 25q1v8w5 | Cournot Equilibrium in Factor Markets | 33 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 4 |
| 3vj9x3d0 | Income Prospects and Age at Marriage | 33 | 8 | 12 | 4 | 9 |
| 4r00j58x | The Two-Sex Problem and the Marriage Squeeze in an Equilibrium Model of Marriage Markets | 33 | 13 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| 5dg0f759 | Can Courtship be Cheatproof? | 33 | 5 | 13 | 6 | 9 |
| 2hs9t971 | A geometry of three-candidate elections | 32 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 7 |
| 5p14x02j | A geometry of three-candidate elections | 31 | 4 | 13 | 7 | 7 |
| 6w72n0p0 | Some Simple Analytics of Peak-Load Pricing | 29 | 7 | 11 | 7 | 4 |
| 0tj4635h | Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions | 28 | 5 | 13 | 4 | 6 |
| 6fh6m5t6 | On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy | 27 | 8 | 12 | 3 | 4 |
| 8951398f | Let me or let George: Motives of competing altruists | 27 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 3 |
| 0wt5j86s | Regulation of Externalities | 26 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 3 |
| 44r2c7pw | Preferences Which Have Open Graphs | 26 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 5 |
| 6k39s3gq | Benefit-cost in a Benevolent Society | 26 | 6 | 11 | 3 | 6 |
| 9zk8750r | Ethics, Evolution, and Games among neighbors | 26 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 2 |
| 85s4v4g6 | Experimental Markets and Chamberlin's Excess Trading Conjecture | 25 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 2 |
| 5259c33t | The Good Samaritan and Traffic on the Road to Jericho | 24 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| 74w8648z | When Do Market Games Have Transferable Utility? | 24 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 5 |
| 0gp06544 | A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Public Goods | 23 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 8 |
| 1fz1335f | Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods? | 23 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 2 |
| 3ds176nn | The Uncommon Insight of Eleanor Ostrom | 23 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 7 |
| 6q53m633 | Two Remarks on Cournot Equilibria | 23 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 1 |
| 0xn4v18c | Collective Choice and the Lindahl Allocation Method | 22 | 1 | 8 | 11 | 2 |
| 3rn170cf | When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics? | 22 | 6 | 11 | 1 | 4 |
| 5jh929bs | On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax | 21 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 4 |
| 8b46s7t4 | Recovering Event Histories by Cubic Spline Interpolation | 21 | 4 | 9 | 5 | 3 |
| 8k9097ww | On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings | 21 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 4 |
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