When Cuban revolutionaries triumphantly rolled into Havana in January 1959, Latin America was thrust onto center stage in the Cold War. The volatile and antagonistic relationship that developed between Cuba and the United States, in which violence was often threatened and sometimes realized, put the Mexican government in a precarious position; they were caught in the middle of their feuding neighbors geographically and politically. How could Mexico manage its relationship with its feuding neighbors, each of which it considered an ally? The ruling Partido Revolucionaro Institucional (PRI) responded by aligning itself more closely with its northern neighbor while simultaneously becoming increasingly repressive, but scholars differ as to why. Many contend that the Mexican government bowed to U.S. pressure in order to stimulate economic development via foreign investment and to ebb communist influence, while others argue that the Mexican government acted on its own aegis to protect its political power. My contention is that it was a combination of both domestic and foreign pressure; the Mexican government sought to simultaneously encourage foreign investment to appease its neighbors to the north and to retain their control of the country. My thesis first analyzes the Mexico-U.S. relationship in order to determine what Mexico had at stake in this ordeal. I then visit Mexico's deep revolutionary history in order to understand the appeal of the Cuban Revolution among wide segments of the Mexican population. Finally, I analyze the ways in which the Mexican government, taking into account U.S. pressure out of fear of communist "contagion" of the western hemisphere, responded to the delicate situation