The Internet today is highly vulnerable to \emph{Internet
catastrophes}: events in which an exceptionally successful Internet pathogen,
like a worm or email virus, causes data loss on a significant percentage of the
computers connected to the Internet. In this paper, we explore the feasibility
of using data redundancy, a model of dependent host vulnerabilities, and
distributed storage to ensure data survives such events. In particular, we
motivate the design of a cooperative, peer-to-peer remote backup system called
the \Phoenix\ recovery system, and we argue that \Phoenix\ is a compelling
architecture for providing a convenient and effective approach for tolerating
Internet catastrophes. Our key observation that makes \Phoenix\ both feasible
and practical is that an Internet catastrophe, like any large-scale Internet
attack, exploits shared vulnerabilities. Hence, the replication mechanism
should take the dependencies of host failures---in this case, host
diversity---into account. Using a simulation model we show that, by doing
informed placement of replicas, \Phoenix\ provide highly reliable and available
cooperative backup and recovery with low overhead: with as few as 2 replicas,
the system can backup and recover at least the equivalent of 20\% of storage
contributed by each host in the system.
Pre-2018 CSE ID: CS2003-0732