International law, especially as it has been modified by the Charter of the United Nations, is grounded on actual or hypothetical agreements among sovereign states. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and related agreements, set a standard of human rights to be observed by sovereign states. Neither the charter nor the declaration specify under what circumstances human rights violations may justify intervention and contravention of the rule of sovereignty. Despite the potential conflict between these two standards on international behavior, there is a widespread belief that a broad range of human rights are based on international law, and that international law is based on a foundation of universally recognized principles of morality.

Moralpolitik, or a morally grounded foreign policy, if it is to have any practical significance, must be rooted in the moral consensus of the political community. There is no reason to assume that all communities will adopt universalistic, legalistic, and rights-based ethical systems. But the predominance of rights-based moral discourse has precluded consideration of alternative political moralities without providing for a hierarchical ordering of competing rights-based norms.

In particular, popular moral discourse does not differentiate between humanitarian rights and political rights. Rights are claimed on individual grounds, cultural grounds, collective social grounds, and political grounds. Often these appeals derive from different and incompatible philosophical positions. For example, the goal of preserving the international system of sovereign states presupposes quite different values than the goal of diffusing democracy or preventing genocide. Although the material interests and the cultural perspectives of the victims of injustice may be invoked as of moral significance in imposing obligations on some or all states, the same sort of interests and perspectives of the states so obliged are rarely considered as a legitimate, integral part of their own moralpolitik.

Out of the Mouth of the Leader:

The Political Ideology of Ayatollah ‘Ali Hosseini Khamenei,

Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran

by

Yvette Hovsepian Bearce

Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor Leonard Binder, Chair

The political ideologies of Ayatollah ʿAli Hosseini Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran, are identified and analyzed based on 500 speeches (1989-2013), 100 interviews (1981-1989), his biography and other works published in Iran. Islamic supremacy, resistance to foreign powers, and progress are the core elements of his ideology. Several critical themes emerge that are consistently reflected in the formation of his domestic and foreign policies: America, Palestine, Israel, Muslim unity, freedom, progress, the nuclear program, youth, and religious democracy.

Khamenei's sociopolitical development is examined in three critical phases: In Phase I, prior to the revolution, he is seen as a political activist protesting for an Islamic government; factors shaping his early political ideology are evaluated. Phase II examines Khamenei's post-revolutionary appointments and election to president; he governs the country through the eight-year Iraq-Iran war. After the death of the father of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, Khamenei enters into Phase III when he assumes the office of supreme leadership; internal and external issues test and reveal his political ideologies.

Research indicates that Khamenei continues to proclaim Khomeini's ideals from the 1979 Islamic Revolution which include supremacy of Islam, the isolation policy of "Neither East, Nor West," and enmity with the U.S. and Israel. His chief foreign policies are to free Palestine, spread the ideals of Iran's Islamic Revolution, and create a global Islamic power. His main domestic focus is progress which entails advances in knowledge, science and technology, and military and nuclear power. Despite severe economic sanctions and confrontations with the West, Khamenei claims that Iran is not producing a bomb.

While he clings to an ideology that began over 50 years ago--ideals rooted in a government where religious rule is interpreted within a political setting--Khamenei is faced with discontent Iranian youth who feel isolated from the global community. With few emotional ties to the revolution, they prefer a government separate from religion. For Khamenei, however, there is no compartmentalization. He maintains his predecessor's isolation policy of resisting colonization, oppression, domination, and opposition (CODO). Out of the mouth of the leader presents Khamenei's ideology in his own words.

Iranian constitutionalism has been in existence since the early twentieth century, and has taken many forms. Despite these decades of experience, Iranian constitutional development has yet to reach maturity, as reflected by the domestic turmoil of its various form of governance. Nevertheless, the Iranian constitutional experiment serves as a valuable case study of constitutional development, especially with respect to Islamic societies. This dissertation derives three principles from Iran's constitutional history and development that provide a foundation for understanding greater constitutional development in the region: (1) constitutionalism is a process-driven, rather than event-driven, phenomenon; (2) constitutional development performs best in conjunction with a republican form of government; and (3) judicial agency, in the form of an empowered judicial branch, is critical to any lasting constitutional process.

This dissertation analyzes a fundamental and ubiquitous facet of Lebanese politics that has been relatively absent from scholarship -- the strategic interaction that occurs amongst and between domestic and regional/extra-regional actors. In Lebanon's complicated political landscape which individuals, political parties or countries are necessary for a political agreement, what makes these actors necessary for an agreement and how do they arrive at an agreement? To answer these questions and make sense of Lebanon's intricate political space, my work employs an innovative framework of analysis, an adaptation of George Tsebelis's veto players approach. Tsebelis's framework provides an ideal way to trace and interpret the agreement-making process because it allows one to incorporate domestic and international politics. The veto players framework is utilized to examine four instances of agreement in Lebanese history that incorporated external actors: 1) the transfer of the presidency from Camille Shamun to Fuad Shihab in 1958; 2) the Cairo Agreement of 1969; 3) the Taif Accord; and 4) the Doha Agreement in 2008.

An extensive analysis of these cases reveals two sets of findings. In regards to Lebanon, I argue that Lebanese politics fluctuates between a 2 and 3- veto player system. The oscillating of actors is attributable to the degree, acquisition and retention of veto power of an actor. Additionally, the foundation of Lebanon's political stability has historically been understood as a modus vivendi between the Maronite Catholics and Sunni Muslims. As these cases have demonstrated, political agreement has never truly been between the leadership of the Maronites and the Sunnis. From a broader perspective I argue that the intra-confessional politics, not inter-confessional politics are critical for the arrival at an agreement. Furthermore, the international factor is crucial to the enhancement of a domestic actor's power, so much so that we find only two exceptions. These findings are not only significant for comprehending Lebanon, but can provide insight into the political dynamics of other weak/failed states.