We propose a novel approach to identity-based choice that focuses on peoples’ representations of the cause-effect relationships that exist among features of their self-concepts. More specifically, we propose that people who believe that a specific aspect of identity, such as a social category, is causally central (linked to many other features of the self- concept) are more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with that aspect than those who believe that the same aspect is causally peripheral (linked to fewer other features). Across three studies, we provide evidence for our approach to identity-based choice. We demonstrate that among people who belong to the same social category, those who believe that the associated identity is more causally central are more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with the social category.

We investigate the age-old questions of what makes us whowe are and what features of identity, if changed, would makeus a different person. Previous approaches to identity havesuggested that there is a type of feature that is most definingof identity (e.g., autobiographical memories or moralqualities). We propose a new approach to identity thatsuggests that, like concepts in general, more causally centralfeatures are perceived as more defining of the self-concept. Inthree experiments, using both measured and manipulatedcausal centrality, we find that changes to features of identitythat are perceived as more causally central are moredisruptive to both the identity of the self and others.

People often incorporate the opinions of others to make predictions about the world, including their preferences for novel experiences and items. In two experiments, we explored how people use the opinions of dissimilar others in making such predictions. While social cognition research has found that similar others tend to influence our judgments more than dissimilar others, the diversity principle from category-based induction argues that we value evidence from diverse sources. Our results suggest that people seek and use information from dissimilar others differently when predicting their own preferences than when making predictions with more verifiable values. For self-relevant predictions, participants were less likely to seek the opinion of dissimilar advisors (Experiment 1) and more likely to contrast their judgments away from these advisors’ opinions (Experiment 2).