This Article contends that the airborne strikes against al-Shabaab are both an unlawful tactic and a tool of U.S. military imperialism. Using legal analysis, an empirical study of open-source data of strike incidents, and historical material, I show how the strikes are unlawful and ineffectual in practice as well as in theory. I argue that the duration of the program despite such legal and practical flaws suggests that the aim of these strikes is not necessarily “killing terrorists” but maintaining continued military presence in Somalia.

This Article proceeds as follows: First, by comparing U.S. government statements that claim the legality of airborne strikes against the actual governing international humanitarian law (IHL) and domestic law standards, I show that the United States does not view either legal framework as any sort of constraint on its actions in Somalia. Second, by conducting a strike-by-strike analysis of U.S. actions against al-Shabaab, I prove that these strikes are unlawful in practice and do not serve any of the United States’ purported reasons for being in Somalia. Third, I turn to the broader history of U.S. military actions in Somalia and the world. When the United States does not act within the bounds of international or domestic law, or even its own counterterrorism goals, I argue that a historic, anti-imperialist critique of the program, rather than a legal one, is more pertinent, especially as U.S. military strategies continue to evolve.