Many scientists describe themselves metaphorically as a “gardener” or “sculptor” of the undergraduate students in their lab and the students’ own research ideas. Across two preregistered studies (N = 1200), we applied existing methods for mapping the entailments of metaphorical concepts to provide insight into lay conceptions of undergraduate research mentoring. Participants were presented with one of several mentoring metaphors and rated how closely a series of mentor attributes fit the metaphor. Iterated exploratory factor analysis revealed a small set of dimensions along which the metaphors differed systematically, reflecting the mentor’s role as a nurturer, authority figure, communicator, and collaborator. The metaphors were also associated with different intuitions about mentors’ responsibility for and power to influence student learning in the lab. Our findings show that mentoring metaphors capture distinct mentor attribute profiles, with implications for how scientists understand and communicate the value of their mentoring approach to their students.

Myriad linguistic cues, subtle and otherwise, have been shown to shape thinking and reasoning. Such linguistic framing effects are attributed variously to irrational biases, affective processes, and analogy. Across two studies, we explored pragmatic reasoning (PR) as a potential unifying mechanism underlying disparate framing effects. In Study 1, we adapted a measure of PR used in attribute framing research, assessing the ability to infer information subtly communicated by a speaker’s choice of frame. Our measure captured individual differences in PR distinct from cognitive reflection and mentalizing ability. In Study 2, PR predicted the effect of identity labels on attitudes towards illegal immigration, but not other framing effects. Two such effects were driven, however, by participants’ explicit recognition of the influence of the framing language. These results suggest that framing effects may indeed be mediated by PR, but that our measure of PR does not fully capture its mediating role.

Although subject-complement statements like “girls are as good as boys at math” seem egalitarian, the group in the complement position (boys) is often judged superior. Across two experiments, we examined whether this syntactic framing effect is driven by the ability to discern the pragmatic implications of the syntax. After reading subject-complement statements about the equal math ability of girls and boys or of unstereotyped social groups, participants judged which group was better at math. They also completed a novel measure of pragmatic reasoning ability for subject-complement statements. We found reliable framing effects regardless of stereotype strength, and these effects were uniquely predicted by pragmatic reasoning ability over and above other social-cognitive factors. Moreover, for unstereotyped groups, pragmatic reasoning ability predicted explicit recognition of, and resistance to, the influence of framing. Our findings point to pragmatic reasoning as both a mechanism driving syntactic framing effects and a tool for counteracting them.