How do political institutions affect violent conflict in divided societies? I argue that where identity-group divisions are highly politically salient, the extent to which marginalized groups are included in key government institutions affects individuals' motives for turning to violence. Integrating government from the "bottom-up," i.e. via the rank-and-file of institutions responsible for implementing policies and enforcing laws, addresses incentives for fighting.

I test this theory of bottom-up integration in the context of one critical policy-implementing institution, the police, and in two divided societies, Iraq and Israel. Using a combination original survey data, new data on police officer demographics, interviews, and a priming experiment, I show that individuals who perceive the police as integrated are less willing to consider using violence against the government. I demonstrate that police integration reduces grievances over current conditions, including biases in police service provision and exclusion from desirable employment, as well of fears of future mistreatment by the police and government.

One of the key arguments is that institutional inclusiveness comes in many forms, and different configurations of inclusiveness predict different outcomes. For example, I demonstrate that integration, in which police officers from all groups work side by side to serve citizens from all groups, dramatically reduces fears of future repression among vulnerable minorities. On the other hand, local-level autonomy, in which citizens are policed by members of their own group, has no such effect. I suggest that the difference lies in the mechanisms integration provides to marginalized groups to impose costs on the state or the dominant group in the future. More generally, institutional inclusiveness matters not as an end unto itself but as a means for balancing power and affecting governance.

This dissertation speaks to the importance of institutions tasked with interpreting, implementing, and enforcing government policies. Institutional solutions to conflict cannot be limited to institutions which select leaders or make laws; they must also consider institutions that enforce the laws. By addressing a critical link in the chain of governance, bottom-up integration confronts the root causes that motivate fighting along sectarian lines.

What motivates legislators in executive-dominated political systems in Africa to focus their attention on national rather than local activities? Scholars and policymakers argue that legislators in such systems have little incentive to participate in national-level politics, leading to parliaments that merely rubber-stamp the policies of the executive. Rather, time is allocated to local issues: providing services to constituents or simply engaging in clientelism and patronage politics.

I question this conventional view and explore three specific questions central to representation and legislative politics in Africa. First, what do voters want from elected representatives in these systems? Second, what do these politicians actually do once in office? Third, why do parties in these contexts often choose processes that ignore the call of their elites and supporters for greater intra-party democracy, and what are the consequences?

In answering these questions, I present a theoretical framework of voter preference for legislator attention as a time allocation problem, and test both my and other prominent theories using data that I gathered from my field and off-site dissertation research in Kenya, including a nationally representative survey experiment, an in-depth focus group discussion, tens of thousands of parliamentary debate transcripts, and the complete universe of 2017 Kenyan party primary aspirants records.

I find that voters have sophisticated understandings of the legislators' role, and prefer some balance between local and national service. Moreover, I find that evidence for electoral connection: electorally secure politicians engage in more nationally oriented speeches, while vulnerable politicians engaged in more locally oriented speeches. Finally, I show that both the ruling and opposition parties are more likely to hold primary elections in party strongholds rather than competitive districts, and that the ruling party was much more likely than the opposition to hold primaries across all levels of partisan support. Taken together, these findings question the idea of African exceptionalism, and make important contributions to the study of legislative politics and politician accountability in Africa.

Every year in Kenya, more than 100,000 children under the age of five die. 90 percent of these deaths can be avoided via the administration of basic essential medicines. Diarrhea is one illness that is easily and cheaply treated, yet more than 5,400 Kenyan children die from it every year. Proper use of oral rehydration solution (ORS) prevents mortality in 93 percent of diarrheal cases, and the average daily dose costs only 15 US cents. Children are dying because they are not receiving this effective and affordable treatment. The main claim of this dissertation is that low uptake of ORS in Kenya is a problem of supply not demand. Contrary to previous scholarship, I will show that Kenyans demand ORS and administer it to their children when it is available. However, ORS is frequently out of stock in local dispensaries. Using data from an independent audit, I show that 40 percent of Ministry of Health dispensaries in western Kenya have zero ORS in stock. I offer suggestive evidence of what is causing this lack of supply: politicians in Kenya are more incentivized to provide highly visible projects rather than high-impact, low-cost solutions.