This dissertation examines how intensional content, i.e., belief ascription, constrains antecedent- gap chains. I defend the proposal that antecedent-gap chains are intensionally uniform: the an- tecedent and the gap must refer to the same thing. The core focus is defective intervention in antecedent-gap chains(Chomsky, 2000, 2001). Previous accounts have attributed defective inter- vention to syntactic mechanisms (Chomsky, 2001; Nevins, 2004; Preminger, 2014). These ac- counts are shown to be at best entirely stipulative and at worst empirically inadequate.
I make two new generalizations concerning defective intervention. The first is that defective interveners are all attitude holders. I support this generalization by closely examining the class of tough-predicates, which permit various kinds of arguments to be projected in the syntax between the antecedent and the gap. The second generalization is that defective intervention only arises when the antecedent-gap chain connects two thematic positions. Again, I justify this generalization by looking closely at the tough-construction, which has itself inspired decades of research. I illustrate that the antecedent-gap chain in the tough-construction is “mitigated” by beliefs, deriving where the tough-construction appears, and why it appears.
The two core theoretical results of this dissertation are, I) a principled and an explanatory ac- count of defective intervention, II) a principled and explanatory account of the tough-construction.