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Lerner's important book is divided into two parts, each of which deals with a significant issue. The first part presents a critique of genetic determinism espoused by contemporary ethology and sociobiology; the second part is a discussion of "developmental contextualism," Lerner's alternative to genetic determinism. Both parts of this book are also controversial: the first because of its treatment of Konrad Lorenz; the second because of the emotional and passionate attachment many still have to genetic determinism. Some have argued that Lerner's characterization of modern ethology and sociobiology is off the mark and outdated; this is, in fact, the case with several of the reviews in this special issue (Kaye, Lamb, Siegel). However, Lerner's characterization still forms the basis of much thinking in modern ethology and sociobiology, particularly in its new guise of "Evolutionary Psychology" (Caporael & Brewer, 1991; DeKay & Buss, 1992).

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Anangenetic Theory in Comparative Psychology

Greenberg, Gary

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 8, Issue 1 (1995)

This paper

is a response to Campbell and Hodos' continuing critiques of the field of comparative psychology. Their opinion to the contrary, I show that anagenesis is still a useful concept to evolution scientists and that anagenetic analysis provides a viable and fruitful approach to theory development in comparative psychology. Anagenesis suggests improvement with evolution and the idea of complexity as an indicator of evolutionary progress is discussed. Finally, the paper discusses the utility of a modified form of the Scala naturae, namely the concept of integrative levels by showing how T. C. Schneirla has used this idea as the foundation of his significant theoretical contributions to comparative psychology

Cover page: Anangenetic Theory in Comparative Psychology

Article

Ethel Tobach, November 7, 1921 – August 15, 2015

Greenberg, Gary

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 28 (2015)

This is an obituary for Ethel Tobach, founder of this journal and of the International Society for Comparative Psychology.

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Cover page: Ethel Tobach, November 7, 1921 – August 15, 2015

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Introduction - Comparative and Neurophychological Research in Human Factors Psychology

Greenberg, Gary

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 5, Issue 4 (1992)

Human

factors, a rapidly growing discipline since World War II, isusually defined as the study of human-machine interactions.

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Depth/Distance Perception in Gerbils and Spiny Mice: Ecological Considerations

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 3, Issue 2 (1989)

Adult and young gerbils and spiny mice were tested for their ability to discriminate between a short and a long arm in a T-maze. Animals were given 20 training trials/day for 5 days. The gerbils' performance improved from about 45% correct responses on Day 1 to about 80% on Day 5; the performances of the spiny mice stayed at about 40-50% over the training period. There were no age differences. These findings complement those of an earlier study in which spiny mice did demonstrate depth perception on a visual cliff while the gerbils did not. Both sets of data are interpreted from an evolutionary perspective which relates depth perception ability to the organism's natural ecological niche: gerbils are burrowing animals and spiny mice are surface and rock dwellers.

Cover page: Depth/Distance Perception in Gerbils and Spiny Mice: Ecological Considerations

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Book review - Inidivdual Development and Evolution: The Genesis of Novel Behavior

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 9, Issue 2 (1996)

Individual Development and Evolution: The Genesis of Novel Behavior,by Gilbert Gottlieb, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1992,231pp.

Cover page: Book review - Inidivdual Development and Evolution: The Genesis of Novel Behavior

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Psychology is a Developmental Science

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Volume 19, Issue 2 (2006)

In this paper we argue that psychology should be understood as a developmental science, and we place the discipline squarely in the realm of the natural sciences. The case is made that scientific progress in psychology has been (and still is) impeded by prolonged misadventures down conceptual dead ends such as biological reductionism, the nature/nurture debate, evolutionary psychology, and the persistent insistence on emphasizing dependent variables that defy observation and measurement, such as “mind” and cognitive modules. We take issue with the behavior geneticist’s approach to psychology while making the case that many psychologists and biologists today seem wholly unaware of many of the most recent experimental results in the area of molecular genetics, especially as they relate to development. We propose that such results, as well as those in the area of nonlinear dynamics, support a developmental systems perspective of psychology emphasizing the epigenetic nature of development as well as the importance and reality of emergent properties in psychology in particular and science in general. Whereas we do not dismiss the significance of biological processes for a full appreciation of behavioral origins, we understand biology to merely be one of many participating factors for psychology.

Cover page: Psychology is a Developmental Science

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The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 3: issues of utility and alternative approaches in psychiatric diagnosis

Abstract In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

Cover page: The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: a pluralogue part 3: issues of utility and alternative approaches in psychiatric diagnosis

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The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue. Part 1: Conceptual and Definitional Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis

Abstract In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

Cover page: The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue. Part 1: Conceptual and Definitional Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis

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The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis

AbstractIn face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.

Cover page: The six most essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis: A pluralogue part 2: Issues of conservatism and pragmatism in psychiatric diagnosis