We have studied a large, random sample of U.S. patents issued between 1996 and 1998. We collected a variety of information about these patents, including area of technology, national origin, the number of inventors, nature and size of the owning entity, the number and type of prior art references, and the time spent in prosecution. We seek to establish relationships between a number of variables in issued patents-such as number of inventors, numbers and types of references to the "prior art," numbers and types of "claims," and length of time between application and issuance-and a number of defined areas of technology. We identify the countries in which particular inventions originated--almost one-half of all issued U.S. patents cover inventions originating in other countries--and test for relationships between the above variables and countries of origin. We also evaluate relationships between countries of origin and areas of technology. The conclusions are somewhat surprising, and point to a patent system that is far from unitary in the way it treats different inventors and different inventions.

Private ordering is in vogue in legal scholarship. Nowhere is this clearer than on the Internet. Legal scholars who study the Internet talk freely about new forms of governance tailored to the specific needs of the Net. Only rarely are these "governance" models ones that involve a significant role for government as classically envisioned. Some scholars see international law, with its emphasis on political and moral suasion rather than legal authority, as the appropriate way to govern what is after all an international phenomenon. Many others, though, look to contracts as the preferred model for governing cyberspace. These models generally rely in the final analysis on a supreme legal authority to establish the initial property entitlements and enforce the contracts that govern the Net. The property-contract model is perhaps better thought of, then, as quasi-private ordering. But the common goal of these quasi-private ordering advocates is to decentralize governance and return control to the people, or at least the people who write the contracts. Contemporaneous with the rise of contracts as a mechanism for Internet governance, another group of legal scholars has explored the existence of what might be thought of as true private ordering: the social relationships that individuals and groups form that operate outside of the law. In this essay, I take a skeptical look at the idea that law should give deference to private norms on the Net and suggest a number of reasons why one might prefer public to private ordering on the Net.

It is common to assert that the Patent and Trademark Office does a bad job of examining patents, and that it should spend more time and money weeding out bad patents. In this article, Professor Lemley challenges that conventional wisdom. Using available data regarding the cost and incidence of patent prosecution, litigation, licensing and other uses of patents, he demonstrates that strengthening the examination process is not cost effective. The core insight is that very few patents are actually litigated or licensed; most simply sit on a shelf unused, or are used only for noncontroversial purposes like financing. Because of this, society would be better off spending its resources in a more searching judicial inquiry into validity in those few cases in which it matters than paying for a more protracted examination of all patents ex ante. In economic terms, the patent office is "rationally ignorant" of the objective validity of the patents it issues.

The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual property rights has long been neglected in debates over the economics of intellectual property. In a path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what he calls "collective rights organizations," industry groups that collect intellectual property rights from owners and license them as a package. Merges finds that these organizations ease some of the tensions created by strong intellectual property rights by allowing industries to bargain from a property rule into a liability rule. Collective rights organizations thus play a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual property rights.

There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectual property owners and users, however. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) regularly encounter situations in which one or more companies claim to own proprietary rights that cover a proposed industry standard. The industry cannot adopt the standard without the permission of the intellectual property owner (or owners).

How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual property rights is critically important. Whether or not private companies retain intellectual property rights in group standards will determine whether a standard is "open" or "closed." It will determine who can sell compliant products, and it may well influence whether the standard adopted in the market is one chosen by a group or one offered by a single company. SSO rules governing intellectual property rights will also affect how standards change as technology improves.

Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual property rights, there has been surprisingly little treatment of SSO intellectual property rules in the legal literature. My aim in this article is to fill that void. To do so, I have studied the intellectual property policies of dozens of SSOs, primarily but not exclusively in the computer networking and telecommunications industries. This is no accident; interface standards are much more prevalent in those industries than in other fields. In Part I, I provide some background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of group standard setting in network markets. In Part II, I discuss my empirical research, which demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs even within a given industry in how they treat intellectual property. In Part III, I analyze a host of unresolved contract and intellectual property law issues relating to the applicability and enforcement of such intellectual property policies. In Part IV, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws place on SSOs in general, and on their adoption of intellectual property policies in particular. Part V offers a theory of SSO intellectual property rules as a sort of messy private ordering, allowing companies to bargain in the shadow of patent law in those industries in which it is most important that they do so. Finally, in Part VI I offer ideas for how the law can improve the efficiency of this private ordering process.

In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things. First, SSO rules governing intellectual property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the study of intellectual property. It is not enough to consider IP rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actually used in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives in different industries. Second, there is a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat IP rights. This diversity is largely accidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between different policies. Third, the law is not well designed to take account of the modern role of SSOs. Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving procompetitive ends. And enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of important but unresolved problems of contract and intellectual property law, issues that will need to be resolved if SSO IP rules are to fulfill their promise of solving patent holdup problems.

My fourth conclusion is an optimistic one. SSOs are a species of private ordering that may help solve one of the fundamental dilemmas of intellectual property law: the fact that intellectual property rights seem to promote innovation in some industries but harm innovation in others. SSOs may serve to ameliorate the problems of overlapping intellectual property rights in those industries in which IP is most problematic for innovation, particularly in the semiconductor, software, and telecommunications fields. The best thing the government can do is to enforce these private ordering agreements and avoid unduly restricting SSOs by overzealous antitrust scrutiny.

The traditional theory of IP is that the prospect of future reward provides an ex ante incentive to innovate. An increasingly common justification for longer and more powerful IP rights is ex post - that IP will be "managed" most efficiently if control is consolidated in a single owner. This argument is made, for example, in the prospect and rent dissipation literature in patent law, in justifications for expansive rights of publicity, and in defense of the Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. Taken to an extreme, this argument justifies perpetual protection with no real exceptions. Those who rely on this theory take the idea of IP as "property" too seriously, and reason that since individual pieces of property are perpetually managed, IP should be too. But IP isn't just like real property; indeed, it gives IP owners control over what others do with their real property. The ex post justification is strikingly anti-market. We would never say today that the market for paper clips would be "efficiently managed" if put into the hands of a single firm. We rely on competition to do that for us. But that is exactly what the ex post theory would do.

In this paper, I explore the sub rosa development of this ex post theory of IP. I argue that the basis for continued control is the assumption that the value of IP rights will be dissipated if they are used too much. This argument is fundamentally at odds with the public goods nature of information. It stems from a particular sort of myopia about private ordering, in which actions by individual private firms are presumed to be ideal and the traditional role of the market in disciplining errant firms is ignored.

We recently studied the outcomes of every final written patent validity decision at both the district court and Federal Circuit levels between 1989 and 1996. The study produced a variety of interesting statistics on patent validity questions. Using the dataset from that study, and matching it with the panels serving on each case, we describe in this paper how individual Federal Circuit judges voted in patent validity cases during that period.

The results may surprise many patent litigators. While there are some interesting differences in voting patterns, our overall conclusion is that the votes of Federal Circuit judges during this period defied easy description. Judges do not fit easily into "pro-patent" or "anti-patent" categories, or into "affirmers" and "reversers." We think this is a good thing for the court system. Still, there are some interesting facts to be found in the data.

We have argued elsewhere that peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing poses significant new challenges to the enforcement of copyright law. Copyright owners' initial response to these challenges - to try to shut down the technologies that facilitate file sharing - is bad for society. We suggested that it would be preferable to lower enforcement costs for copyright owners by making dispute resolution by copyright owners against direct infringers quick and cheap, so that copyright owners would be more inclined to pursue such direct infringers instead of suing innovators. While enforcement costs are likely always to be too great to allow pursuit of every infringer, lower costs would allow for enforcement against more infringers, increasing any given infringer's chance of being sued. In this article, we explain how such a dispute resolution system might work, and propose a draft amendment to the copyright act to implement the system.

In this paper, we address the question of "open access" and its relationship to the architecture of the Internet. It is our view that the extraordinary growth and innovation of the Internet depends crucially upon this architecture. Changes in this architecture should be viewed with skepticism, as they may in turn threaten this innovation and growth. Many cable companies have recently adopted or threatened a policy of bundling high-speed cable modem service with ISP service. This bundling threatens to compromise an important architectural principle of the Internet: the Internet's "End-to-End" design. In our view, this change could have profound implications for the future of growth and innovation on the net. The FCC's analysis of the cable modem industry to date has not considered these principles of the Internet's design. It therefore does not adequately evaluate the potential threat that bundling presents to open access to the Internet. Neither does the FCC's approach properly account for its role in creating the conditions that made the Internet possible. Under the banner of "no regulation," the FCC threatens to permit this network to calcify as earlier telecommunications networks did. Further, and ironically, the FCC's supposed "hands off" approach will ultimately lead to more rather than less regulation. We do not yet know enough about the relationship between these architectural principles and the innovation of the Internet. But we should know enough to be skeptical of changes in its design. The strong presumption should be in favor of preserving the architectural features that have produced this extraordinary innovation. The FCC's presumption should be against approving mergers or policies that threaten these design principles, without a clear showing that the threat would not undermine the Internet's innovation.

It is common to assert that the Patent and Trademark Office does a bad job of examining patents, and that it should spend more time and money weeding out bad patents. In this article, Professor Lemley challenges that conventional wisdom. Using available data regarding the cost and incidence of patent prosecution, litigation, licensing and other uses of patents, he demonstrates that strengthening the examination process is not cost effective. The core insight is that very few patents are actually litigated or licensed; most simply sit on a shelf unused, or are used only for noncontroversial purposes like financing. Because of this, society would be better off spending its resources in a more searching judicial inquiry into validity in those few cases in which it matters than paying for a more protracted examination of all patents ex ante. In economic terms, the patent office is "rationally ignorant" of the objective validity of the patents it issues.

Suing actual infringers is passe in copyright law. In the digital environment, the real stakes lie in suing those who facilitate infringement by others. There is of course a good reason copyright owners are filing such suits. They see themselves as under threat from a flood of cheap, easy copies and a dramatic increase in the number of people who can make those copies. The high volume of illegal uses, and the low return to suing any individual, make it more cost-effective to aim as far up the chain as possible. From the perspective of the movie industry, it's easier and more effective to shut down Napster than to sue the millions of people who traded files illegally on Napster. So far, the courts have been willing to go along, shutting down a number of innovative services in the digital music realm.

In this article, we argue that unrestricted liability for anyone who is in any way involved with copyright infringement is a bad idea. Indirect liability is a continuum, in which acts most closely related to infringement and with the fewest affirmative benefits are the easiest to condemn. Going after makers of technology for the uses to which their technologies may be put threatens to stifle innovation. The fundamental difficulty is that while courts can make decisions about direct infringement on a case-by-case basis, lawsuits based on indirect liability necessarily sweep together both socially beneficial and socially harmful uses of a program or service, either permitting both uses or condemning both.

Optimal digital copyright policy would do two things: stop deterring innovators, and permit cost-effective enforcement of copyright in the digital environment. In this paper, we suggest at least two possible alternatives that might provide ways out of the digital copyright morass. Both alternatives stem from the basic economics of copyright enforcement. It is not currently cost-effective for copyright owners to sue individual infringers, because there are tens of millions of them, because lawsuits are expensive, and because each infringer would be liable only for minimal damages. They are happy to sue facilitators instead, because there are fewer of them and both damages and the benefits of injunctive relief are substantial. Copyright owners have no incentive to permit optimal innovation by facilitators, because they do not benefit from that innovation except indirectly. Individual infringers in turn have no incentive to change their behavior or to subscribe to fee-based services, because they suffer none of the costs of infringement.

One solution is to change the incentives of individuals. Because individual users of peer-to-peer (p2p) networks know that it is extremely unlikely they will be sued, economic theory suggests that the only way to effectively deter infringement is to increase the effective sanction substantially for those who are caught. Were the government to begin criminally prosecuting selected users of peer-to-peer services - or were the RIAA to sue end users in earnest - it could have a substantial deterrent effect on many illegal users. Selective prosecution has other advantages as well - the government could target the relatively few keystone providers of illegal files on p2p sites, and those are precisely the users who are least likely to be engaged in fair use. While particular prosecutions won't stop illegal file trading altogether, copyright owners have never been able to prevent all piracy. All they need to do is reduce piracy enough that they can make a return on their investment.

Another solution is to change the incentives of copyright owners to sue individual infringers by reducing the cost of such a suit. One such approach would be a levy system. Levies on equipment or services have the virtue of permitting automatic collection of royalties, reducing the enforcement cost dramatically, but at the cost of taxing legal as well as illegal uses. A levy solves the enforcement problem at the front end, but it is similar in many ways to the current approach of suing facilitators. The main difference is that under a levy system the copyright owner is protected by a compulsory license rather than a property rule.

An alternative proposal to reduce the cost of enforcement is to create some sort of quick, cheap arbitration system that enables copyright owners to get some limited relief against abusers of p2p systems. The existing domain name trademark arbitration system is a model in some respects - its speed and low cost - but a cautionary tale in others - its lack of process protections. Such a system would permit low-cost enforcement of copyright infringement against direct infringers, reducing the need for content owners to sue facilitators. Relative to levies, an arbitration system would trade off some increase in cost for accuracy, targeting only those making illegal uses rather than all users of computers or p2p networks. It would be fairer than selective criminal prosecution, because the burden would fall more evenly on each wrongdoer, rather than imposing stark punishment on a few in order to serve society's interest in deterring the rest. The system could also be designed to improve accuracy relative to the binary choice the courts face in indirect infringement cases today. We could design the system so that it is limited to clear cases. We could also build in a defense for arguable fair uses, so that a user who could prove they were space-shifting CDs they already own would have a defense