Resolving overloading in communication requires attention to context. Previous research has found that the mutual assumption of cooperation during communication can act as a powerful constraint, allowing successful resolution under ambiguity. In this study, we investigate two specific types of cooperative context used in a communicative task which arise from different sources: beliefs and actions. In belief-driven communication, signals are interpreted in context of what else a speaker could have said about the world. Here communicators assume that the speaker aims to change the listener's beliefs by providing the most straightforward signal. In action-driven communication, signals are considered in terms of what a speaker can reasonably ask others to do. Signaling can be sensitive to utility considerations of acting and interacting in the physical world. Through a communication game, we tested how listeners would interpret an ambiguous signal using belief-driven or action-driven strategies. We find that while no one strategy is dominant overall, individuals are highly consistent in which strategy they employ when forced to decide.

The ability to take action according to a partially defined plan allows humans to resolve a distant future, even when steps are missing between the present and that future. Adhering to this partial plan requires an intentional commitment that curbs distracting desires conflicting with the planned course of action, enabling humans to act coherently over long horizons. This research (N = 50, 23 boys, ages 5-6, Chinese) explored the cognitive development of commitment to partial plans in a sequential decision-making task, and its correlation to participant capacity for attentional control. Our results suggest that only 6-year-olds committed to partial plans, and moreover, that in both age groups, intentional commitment was positively correlated with the use of proactive control. These findings indicate that intentional commitment does not develop simultaneously with the understanding of intention at infancy, but rather matures gradually in parallel with the development of attentional control.