The Left came to power in the 2000s after a period of neoliberal reforms. During the prior decade, conservative parties across the region had adopted austerity policies that reversed many social protections. These policies not only increased inequality, poverty, and unemployment, but also severely weakened unions. Leftist candidates were subsequently elected throughout the South American continent with a clear mandate to address these reversals. Individuals prioritized policies of income redistribution that provided immediate material relief. Popular-sector organizations also demanded policies that restored and/or enhanced their power and resources. Specifically, they demanded two types of power redistribution: societal empowerment and state empowerment, i.e. policies to increase their demand-making capacity in the interest arena, and those to increase their power vis-à-vis the national executive. Why, despite these common demands, did leftist parties adopt varying redistributive approaches across the region?

This study distinguishes three main redistributive approaches in Latin America. Poverty Alleviation (Brazil and Chile) consisted of redistribution of only income and only to those at the very bottom of the income ladder, without empowering popular-sector organizations. In Left Populism (Argentina and Venezuela) policies redistributed income to a broader segment of the popular sectors, and also redistributed societal power, but not state power. Social Democracy (Uruguay and Bolivia) was the most highly redistributive strategy. Income redistribution was broad, and social organizations benefited from the redistribution of both societal and state power.

This analysis argues that these three redistributive approaches are explained by the degree to which leftist presidents control the Left movement. In the context of post-ISI (import substitution industrialization) economies, all presidents face intense economic pressures to engage in more limited forms of redistribution. Theories that point to variations in exposure to market pressures or the strength of the Right cannot explain differences among the three redistributive outcomes identified here. Rather, the argument points to political challenges to the president from within the Left: Presidents will disregard economic pressures toward limited forms of redistribution when they face threats to their leadership from actors within the Left, three in particular: social organizations (unions and social movements), rival leftist parties, and party factions and/or party base organizations with considerable veto power within the president’s party. If the president does not control them, the government will engage in substantial redistribution to build coalitions with them and consolidate his/her leadership over the Left. The present argument is thus directly opposed to standard arguments that the power of the Left facilitates the adoption of more extensive redistributive policies. Instead, somewhat paradoxically, the analysis argues that the stronger a leftist president is, the more he or she will respond to economic constraints, and the less he or she will pursue the redistributive preferences of the Left. Conversely, the weaker the president, the more far-reaching will be his or her redistributive policies.