Following the passage of Measure 44, which raised the cigarette tax by $0.30 in 1996, Oregon created its comprehensive Tobacco Prevention and Education Program (TPEP) in 1997 funded by 10% of Measure 44 revenues.

The Tobacco Free Coalition of Oregon (TOFCO) was a broad coalition of the voluntary health organizations and community partners that facilitated media advocacy and grassroots opportunities for clean indoor air policies and funding for TPEP.

Successful tobacco control efforts in Oregon at the state and local levels were instrumental in reducing per capita cigarette consumption by 11.3% in two years (1997-1999).

Local tobacco control coalitions were successful in passing (and defending) tobacco control policies from 1997 to 2001. The local ordinances in Corvallis (1998) and Eugene (2000) were regarded as model language for their 100% smokefree laws. In contrast, the Multnomah County smokefree workplace ordinance (1999) passed with a number of exemptions, including bars and bar areas of restaurants, and was later used as a model for the preemptive statewide smokefree workplace law.

In Oregon, the tobacco industry spent a total of $3,145,553 on lobbying and campaign contributions to legislators, political parties, and constitutional officers from 1997 to 2006. Republican political action committees (PACs) received nearly five times more than Democratic PACs; tobacco companies spent more than four times more on Republicans than Democrats in the legislature.

The tobacco industry attempted to hamper tobacco control efforts through several hospitality and retail organizations, but their most powerful ally was the Oregon Restaurant Association (ORA), which had one of the largest PACs in the state and was a major political player.

With an increasing number of local clean indoor air ordinances, the tobacco industry fought tobacco control efforts at the state level, where they had an obvious advantage with campaign contributions and well-connected lobbyists.

In 2001, tobacco industry lobbyists attacked TPEP with legislation that attacked TPEP’s credibility, infrastructure, and success passing local clean indoor air ordinances. In this negative policy environment, the ORA cut a deal with the Democratic Governor to enact the Indoor Clean Air Act of 2001, which preempted local governments from passing stronger laws and exempted bars, bar areas of restaurants, bingo halls, and bowling alleys. These exemptions were not removed until 2007 and will not actually be removed until 2009.

In another blow to tobacco control during the 2001 legislative session, TPEP was subject to “illegal lobbying” allegations, a tobacco industry tactic previously employed in California and elsewhere. The result of these claims was a “budget note” added to the TPEP appropriation by the Legislature that specifically restricted TPEP from lobbying for tobacco control ordinances and requiring local programs to advocate for passing tobacco control ordinances.

Among tobacco control advocates, the 2001 budget note initiated a more cautious attitude that outlasted the budget note's applicability to the 2001-03 budget cycle. The passage of the preemptive state law in the same session further limited the advocate's ability to pass effective tobacco control policies.

Oregon and 45 other states settled outstanding lawsuits against the four largest tobacco companies with the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998. Since the first payment in 1999, no money has been dedicated to tobacco prevention and education in Oregon as of 2007.

Tobacco control advocates defeated two ballot measures in 2000 that would have dedicated either none or a minimal amount of the MSA’s revenue stream to tobacco prevention and education.

Until 2004, Oregon’s cigarette tax was comprised of a permanent tax and a $0.10 temporary tax enacted in 1993 and dedicated to the Oregon Health Plan (OHP). The 10-cent tax was renewed every two years by the legislature.

In 2002, Measure 20 increased the cigarette tax by $0.60 to a total of $1.28 to generate new revenue anticipated to fill budget shortfalls. Advocates were unable to secure a permanent percentage of the tax increase for tobacco control, but TPEP received a onetime transfer of $2 million.

Oregon’s cigarette tax fell to $1.18 in 2004 after the tobacco industry funded anti-tax group, Citizens for a Sound Economy, attached the extension of the $0.10 temporary tax to Measure 30, a revenue-raising measure that included unpopular personal income and corporate tax increases in the midst of a statewide recession. Measure 30 failed, and Oregon’s cigarette tax decreased.

Using the state’s difficult budget shortfalls as a reason, legislators in the 2003 session completely defunded TPEP, shutting it down in March 2003. (Other programs funded by Measure 44 were cut, but only TPEP was shut down.)

Some funding was reinstated in December 2003, with a biennial budget that was 34% of its 2001-03 budget and 17% of the CDC’s minimum for state tobacco control programs. This disruption in funding had serious negative impacts on program staffing and continuity.

TPEP operated on a severely reduced budget during the 2003-05 and 2005-07 bienniums because Measure 44 funds were diverted by the state legislature to pay for OHP.

Since the significant reductions in TPEP’s budget, per capita cigarette consumption declined at a much slower rate than before, and now appears to have plateaued.

TOFCO has often been restrained by other political priorities of its member organizations, and tobacco control advocates have over-relied on contract lobbyists to set policy agendas and steer negotiations.

Oregon may be entering a period of resurgence after several setbacks caused the program to fall out of the national spotlight. The tobacco control movement in Oregon needs strong leaders who are less cautious and can mobilize public support throughout the state, not just the metropolitan hubs.

Maine has a small population, with a relatively high proportion of people living in the state’s major population centers, making Maine politics function more like a large city than a state, fostering bipartisan efforts to pass progressive tobacco control legislation despite the presence of tobacco industry lobbyist from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s.

Credit for Maine’s successes in tobacco prevention and control can be attributed to two major factors: A cohesive and collaborative partnerships among tobacco control advocates with effective lobbying strategies (individually tailored campaigns rather than a one-size-fits-all approach) and diversified funding strategies.

Since 1983, the Maine Coalition on Smoking or Health partnered with more than 100 state and municipal agencies, including the American Cancer Society, New England Division, the Maine Lung Association, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield, the American Heart Association, and the Maine Center for Public Health.

Strong and consistent individual commitment to tobacco control, including support from the Maine Department of Health and numerous legislators, gave an advantage to tobacco control bills and laws.

Early tobacco control legislation focused on the protection of indoor air, and struggled against powerful tobacco industry lobbyists. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Maine legislature passed significant and progressive smoke-free air laws , including but not limited to smoke-free restaurants (1999), bars (2003), and cars (2008), as well as tobacco excise tax increases (the latest, in 2005, raised the excise tax from $1 to $2 per pack) and the establishment of a state tobacco control program.

Tobacco control advocates in Maine were successful because they were able to sell a collective vision to health organizations in the state, and convinced these organizations to give up a little for the greater good of Maine’s residents.

Tobacco prevention and control efforts did not begin in earnest until the mid 1990s, when Maine was faced with highest youth smoking rates in the country. In 1997, Maine’s network of health advocates worked with Governor Angus King (I), to promote a tobacco excise tax increase to fund a tobacco prevention and control program. This success was followed in 1999 with the statewide smoke-free restaurant bill, and smoke-free bars in 2003. By 2008, cars and outdoor dining areas were also smoke-free, passing easily without significant opposition from tobacco industry lobbyists.

After the tobacco excise tax was doubled in 1997, Maine experienced with a dramatic reduction in youth smoking rates from 35% in 1997 to 20% in 2003.

Adult smoking rates also declined steadily in Maine from 25% in 1996 to 18% in 2008. This was accomplished mainly through the state quit line along with the Partnership for a Tobacco-Free Maine’s (PTM) media campaigns targeting parents and adults.

Despite the successes of the state tobacco control program, PTM at reducing youth smoking, the program’s narrow focus was at the expense of other vulnerable demographics, most significantly, young adults age 18-25. In 2007, 35% of young adults in Maine smoked at rates similar to 1992 levels (35%).

Maine’s tobacco control advocates have worked tirelessly to protect the Fund for a Healthy Maine (FHM), Maine’s funding mechanism for the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), the result of the 1998 lawsuit filed against the major US tobacco companies, which secured more than $40 million annually for the state. The statewide support of the FHM has been a result of the careful orchestration of the FHM’s diverse funding structure that has enlarged the circle of recipient beneficiaries.

In 2001, PTM began receiving funds from the Master Settlement Agreement. Because of these funds, despite severe budget shortfalls since 1998, the PTM reported that tobacco control in Maine was funded at or just short of the CDC Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Recommended Guidelines each year. In 2008, the Maine Center for Disease control acknowledged that their tobacco control funding, dedicated by the Legislature from the FHM, had been allocated to fund a variety of chronic disease programs in addition tobacco control, and that their reported spending had not been accurate. A portion of tobacco control funds were either unaccounted for or had been allocated to chronic disease programs. Beginning in 2009, PTMs accounting reflected the actual reduced funding level for tobacco control.

The Partnership for a Tobacco-Free Maine’s misrepresentation of spending resulted in the diversion millions of dollars from tobacco control to other healthcare programs since 1999.

Despite the state’s successes in reducing youth and adult smoking rates, there is a significant amount of work to be accomplished. To continue to reduce the burden of tobacco-induced disease, PTM must increase spending for tobacco prevention and control, and fund programs at levels recommended by the US CDC Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Recommended Guidelines.