This paper applies a probit estimation to assess the relationship between economic takeoffs during 1950-2000 and inflows of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI, controlling for country’s stock of short-termexternal debt and commodity terms of trade. Average level of FDI inflows is associated with a 23 percenthigher takeoff probability relative to a zero FDI inflow benchmark, and this effect is highest for the LatinAmerica subsample, with a 65 rise in takeoff probability. Higher stock of short term external debt hasbeen associated with a substantial negative effect on the probability of a takeoff, and the effect of theshort terms debt overhang is largest for Latin American countries. Yet, virtually all the takeoffs wereassociated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. At the sample mean, inflow of portfolio debt is associatedwith approximately 25 percent higher probability of a takeoff. In contrast, a one standard deviationincrease in equity outflows (inflows) is associated with a 47 percent (17 percent) decline in the probabilityof a takeoff. A one standard deviation improvement in commodity terms of trade is associated with 28percent higher takeoff probability.

manufacturing industries, 99 countries, 1991-2007, extending Rajan-Zingales (1998). We utilize externalfinance dependence measures in a series of cross-sectional regressions of manufacturing industries’growth rates covering 17 years. Net portfolio debt inflows are negatively associated with growth duringthe mid 1990s. The magnitudes of the negative effect of surges in portfolio debt inflows on growth aresubstantial in the late 1990s for a number of countries. The effect of debt inflows on growth in the 2000sis rather muted. Surges in portfolio equity inflows also exhibit a negative association with aggregategrowth in the manufacturing sector. For instance, the inflow surge during the financial liberalizationperiod, 1993-1994, is associated with a sharp decline in aggregate manufacturing sector growth, but a risein the growth of relatively more financially constrained industries. Equity inflows exhibited economicallysignificant positive impact on the growth of financially constrained industries, unlike their negativeimpact on the average manufacturing growth rate. FDI inflows exhibit a positive association withaggregate manufacturing growth during most of the sample period, both at the aggregate level andspecifically for the industries in need of external financing.

This paper investigates the factors explaining exchange market pressures (EMP) and thehoarding and use of international reserves (IR) by emerging markets during the 2000s, as the GreatModeration turned to the 2008-9 global crisis and great recession. According to our results, bothfinancial and trade factors played important roles, yet the relative magnitude of financial considerationsdominated, both during the Great Moderation and during the crisis. The coefficient of gross short-termexternal debt quintuples during the onset of the crisis, and then gradually declines as we let the crisiswindow roll forward. Capital outflow (induced by global deleveraging) was the force behind theemerging markets EMP rise during the global financial crisis, with the emerging markets’ stock marketsthemselves only playing a secondary role. In addition, emerging markets were greatly affected by thefall in commodity prices during the initial phase of the crisis, although the relative impact of tradefactors remained virtually the same in magnitude during the financial crisis and the Great Moderationperiod that preceded it. We also study the association between several country-level indicators, as of2007, and the EMP measure during the height of the crisis in 2008:Q4 in a cross sectional regression.We found that that richer EMs experienced greater EMP during the crisis. Greater FDI inflows prior tothe crisis were associated with a lower crisis EMP, while greater portfolio debt inflows with a highercrisis EMP, and this effect is much larger than the mitigation effect associated with greater FDI inflows.We conclude with an analysis of the factors that account for the trade and financial exposure ofemerging markets during the crisis, finding that pre-crisis financial and trade openness are significantpredictors of the financial and trade shock during the crisis. The severity of the financial shock wasfurther exacerbated by financial ties to the U.S., while the trade shock was more severe in EMs with alarger commodity export share.

This paper examines how financial expansion and contraction cycles affect the broader economy throughtheir impact on eight real economic sectors in a panel of 28 countries over 1960-2005, paying particularattention to large, or sharp, contractions and magnifying and mitigating factors. We find that abruptfinancial contractions are more likely to follow periods of accelerated growth, indicative of ‘up by thestairs, down by the parachute’ dynamics. Sharp fluctuations in the financial sector have asymmetriceffects, with the majority of real sectors adversely affected by contractions but not helped by expansions.The adverse effects of financial contractions are transmitted almost exclusively by the financial opennesschannel with foreign reserves mitigating these effects with a sizeable (10 to 15 times greater) impactduring sharp financial contractions. Both effects are magnified during particularly large financialcontractions (with coefficients on interaction terms two to three times greater than when all contractionsare considered). Consequent upon a financial contraction, the most severe real sector contractions occur incountries with high financial openness; relative predominance of construction, manufacturing, andwholesale and retail sectors; and low international reserves.